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INTRODUCTION
Since the California Gold Rush in 1848, the mining of hard rock
minerals (e.g., gold, silver, and similar minerals) on public lands has been
based on the principle that discovery and development of mineral resources
led to private ownership, promoting exploration and discovery of mineral
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resources. As with other nineteenth century land disposal statutes, such as
the various homestead laws, the General Mining Law of 1872' provides for
provision of mineral rights and even fee simple title 2 to land based on the
satisfaction of conditions related to use of the land and does not require
significant payments to the federal government for receipt of title. In
recent years, however, the 1872 statute has come under increased criticism
as "a giveaway of publicly owned resources, ' 3 often by environmental
pressure groups interested in reducing or eliminating mining on public
lands altogether.4 Critics of the Mining Law have been unable to muster
sufficient political support to change the law. As Mining Law critic, and
former Interior Department Solicitor John Leshy summed it up: "various
pressures for reform have tended to cancel each other out in the only arena
where final, fundamental change can be provided: the Congress." 5
After a failed attempt to dramatically change the structure of federal
mining law through legislation in the early 1990s, environmental pressure
groups and the Clinton Administration turned to administrative actions to
bring about the changes that they were unable to persuade Congress to
agree. The most dramatic of these changes were embodied in a revision to
43 C.F.R. Subpart 3809 ("the 3809 regulations"), one of the record-
breaking number of "midnight regulations" issued in the waning days of
the Clinton Administration.
1. 30 U.S.C. § 22 (2000).
2. "Fee simple" is a legal term denoting the maximum "bundle of rights" possible in a
unit of land: a legal right to perpetual ownership. Under the Mining Law, claimants may opt
for full title or mineral rights only. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FEDERAL LAND
MANAGEMENT: THE MINING LAW OF 1872 NEEDS REVISION, GAO/RCED-89-72, 10 (1989)
("Any U.S. citizen could stake a claim to a mineral deposit and, if it could be mined
economically, patent the claim, thereby acquiring fee simple title to both the mineral
resources and the land covered by the claim.").
3. MARC HUMPHRIES & CAROL HARDY VINCENT, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE
ISSUE BRIEF FOR CONGRESS, IB89130: MINING ON FEDERAL LANDS (2001) available at
http://www.ncseonline.org/NLE/CRSreports/Mining/mine- I .cfm?&CFID=7892272&CFT
OKEN=54679835v.
4. One measure of environmental pressure groups' hostility to mining activities is the
recent appearance of "precautionary principle" justifications for additional regulation. See,
e.g., Johanna H. Wald & Susannah French, The Mining Law of 1872: A Law Whose Time
Has Gone, in THE PIRACY OF AMERICA 79 (Judith Scherff ed., 1999) ("In fact, one of the
greatest concerns about today's mining boom is that its full environmental legacy may not
appear for decades after activities now underway have ended or been abandoned ....
Clearly, we are engaged in a dangerous experiment with dire consequences for human
health and the environment."). For a discussion of the issues involved in applying the
"precautionary principle," see generally INDUR M. GOKLANY, THE PRECAUTIONARY
PRINCIPLE: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL RISK ASSESSMENT (2001).
5. JOHN D. LESHY, THE MINING LAW: A STUDY IN PERPETUAL MOTION 5 (1987).
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This paper examines the regulatory history of hard rock mining as a case
study of the politicization of environmental regulation. "Midnight
regulations," such as those described here, are an increasingly common
phenomenon: in 2000, the outgoing Clinton Administration issued a record
26,605 pages of midnight regulations in the Federal Register in its last
three months.6  By comparison, in similar periods during the Clinton
Administration the Federal Register ran about 17,000 pages.7 The use of
midnight regulations is not new-the Federal Register was three times its
normal size during the last days of the Carter Administration8 and President
John Adams made numerous midnight appointments during his
administration's final days, including the appointment of William
Marbury,9 which led to the landmark constitutional law case of Marbury v.
Madison.'0 Indeed, a Mercatus Center study found that "[s]ince 1948, the
long-run tendency is for regulations during the post-election quarter to
increase nearly 17 percent (16.8 percent) on average over the volumes
prevailing during similar periods in off-election years.""
We will show how these regulations represent a growing threat to the
rule of law and the rights of individuals. After examining the regulatory
history of the 3809 regulations, this article draws conclusions about how
the regulatory process might be restructured to prevent the problems
associated with "midnight regulations."
1. POLITICS AND REGULATION
Since the New Deal, the federal government's role in the economy has
regularly expanded. 12 Much of the federal role has come in the form of
regulations issued by federal agencies rather than in the form of statutes
passed by Congress. Unlike legislation, which must gain majority support
of both houses of Congress as well as the consent of the executive (or the
support of two-thirds of both houses to override a presidential veto),
regulations are issued by executive action alone.' 3 As a result, regulations
6. Give Federal Regulations Close Look, ATLANTA J., Nov. 1, 2001, at A 18; see also
COCHRAN, infra note 11.
7. Clinton's Midnight Rush, INVESTOR'S BUSINESS DAILY, Nov. 29, 2000, at A24.
8. Deirdre Davidson & Jenna Greene, Clinton Regulators: Getting the Last Laugh,
LEGAL TIMES, Dec. 4, 2000, at 24.
9. William S. Morrow, Jr., Midnight Regulations: Natural Order or Disorderly
Governance, 26 ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS 3 (Spring 2001).
10. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
11. JAY COCHRAN, III, MERCATUS CENTER, THE CINDERELLA CONSTRAINT: WHY
REGULATIONS INCREASE SIGNIFICANTLY DURING POST-ELECTION QUARTERS 3 (Oct. 5, 2000).
12. See ROBERT HIGGS, CRISIS AND LEVIATHAN (1987).
13. One might argue that regulations are issued by the executive branch, at least
nominally under the control of the one federal official elected nationally (the President).
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are not subject to the political constraints of congressional debate and
approval. This is not to say there are no political constraints on regulations,
merely that they are different and, as argued below, sometimes weaker.
Of course, not all legislation is actually read and understood by those
voting on it. The hundreds of pages of complex statutory provisions
contained in the 1977 amendments to the Clean Air Act, for example,
passed both houses of Congress on voice votes at the end of the session
with almost no chance for the many important changes to be publicized, let
alone debated. 14 More recently, discovering who was responsible for a
politically unpopular provision of a 2002 homeland security statute was
difficult.15 Nonetheless, members of Congress were politically accountable
for passing these pieces of legislation (even if individual accountability was
muffled by measures such as voice votes) and the President was
accountable for signing them. This accountability acts as an important
check on legislators' and Presidents' actions. As Prof. Martin Redish
noted, "ultimate accountability to the populace-if only indirectly" was
"the sine qua non" of the Founders' vision of American government. 16 It
operates as a stronger constraint than the accountability of only the
President for regulations issued by executive agencies, particularly during
the lame duck period at the end of an administration.
Regulations can also cause problems (and create benefits) for members
of Congress and the President. Unpopular regulations can lead to political
pressure to change the outcome. 17 Giving agencies the job of making the
politically unpopular tradeoffs necessary to implement popular legislation
can provide legislators with an opportunity to distance themselves from the
negative consequences of popular legislation. Regulations thus provide the
government actors who are nominally politically responsible a useful, if
However, post-election, lame-duck period regulations are issued during a time in which the
President is no longer subject to any realistic political constraints, but more focused on
establishing his "legacy," thus putting him beyond the normal political controls.
14. See Andrew P. Morriss, The Politics of the Clean Air Act, in POLITICAL
ENVIRONMENTALISM: GOING BEYOND THE GREEN CURTAIN 296 (Terry L. Anderson, ed.,
2000) (describing passage of 1977 amendments).
15. See, e.g., Behind Closed Doors, INDIANAPOLIS NEws, Dec. 29, 2002, at B3,
available at 2002 WL 104749899 (describing controversy over authorship of a provision
exempting vaccine manufacturers from liability in the homeland security bill). As a result
of the public outcry, the provision will likely be repealed by later legislation. Helen Dewar,
Senate to Repeal Law Shielding Drug Giants, WASH. POST, Jan. 11, 2003, at A4. This
further demonstrates the importance of political accountability.
16. Martin H. Redish, Judicial Discipline, Judicial Independence, and the
Constitution: A Textual and Structural Analysis, 72 S. CAL. L. REv. 673, 673-74 (1999).
17. Indeed, this can even be a benefit for the politicians, who then get credit for
"solving" the problems created by the bureaucracy.
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dangerous, tool with which to distance themselves from the more
unpopular consequences of regulatory statutes.
In addition to issuing formal regulations, agencies have broad
administrative powers that can be used to change department policy. For
example, with respect to mining regulations, the Secretary of Interior can
do a great deal in addition to issuing regulations:
Acting through the Department's Solicitor, or agency heads, the Secretary may issue
legal opinions or instruct the agency to act (or not to act) in a particular way. The
Secretary may also assume jurisdiction of and adjudicate an appeal pending before
the Office of Hearings and Appeals, or review any decision of any employee of the
Department, including any administrative judge or board. Those decisions may
include mining claim contests, mineral patent applications, decisions on mining plans
of operations, or the exercise of discretion over enforcement actions involving mining
claim location, exploration, or mining operations. In the management of public lands,
the Secretary has unique authority under the Federal Land Policy and Management
Act to withdraw lands from operation of the mining laws.18
These broad powers allow the Secretary of the Interior to influence
policy without utilizing his rulemaking powers.
Although Congress has delegated considerable power to agencies to
regulate in different ways under various federal laws, it has also sought to
restrict agency autonomy in several important ways. First, Congress
requires agencies to follow particular procedures in issuing regulations.
These procedures are designed to allow affected parties to have input into
the regulatory process and to provide a basis for challenging issued
regulations. Thus, for example, many agencies are required to follow the
federal Administrative Procedure Act (APA)' 9 in issuing regulations.
Under the APA's notice and comment rulemaking provisions, agencies
must provide public notice of the content of proposed regulations, 20 accept
public comments on the rules,2' and consider and respond to significant
comments in framing the final rule.2 Failure to follow these procedural
requirements can lead to the regulations being overturned in court.23
Second, Congress retains general oversight powers over agencies.
18. Patrick Garver & Mark Squillace, Mining Law Reform-Administrative Style, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE ROCKY MOUNTAIN MINERAL LAW FORTY-FIFTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE,
14-8 to 14-9 (1999) (citations omitted).
19. 5 U.S.C. § 551 (2000).
20. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (2000).
21. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2000).
22. Id. ("After consideration of the relevant matter presented, the agency shall
incorporate in the rules a concise general statement of their basis and purpose."); see also
United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 252 (2d Cir. 1977) ("It is not
in keeping with a rational process to leave vital questions, raised by comments which are of
cogent materiality, completely unanswered.").
23. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(d) (2000).
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Through tools short of legislative action, such as holding hearings and
placing restrictions on agency appropriations, Congress can apply pressure
to agencies to shape regulatory policy. For example, Michigan Democrat
John Dingell has often used his position in the House of Representatives to
shape the Environmental Protection Agency's regulation of automobiles in
ways favorableto the automobile industry.
24
Third, both Congress and the President have created informational
requirements for regulations that force agencies to consider particular types
of information before acting. For example, the Regulatory Flexibility Act
requires federal agencies to consider proposed rules and alternatives that
minimize the impact on small entities.25  Although agencies are not
required to adopt an alternative that minimizes the burdens, by forcing
them to consider the alternatives, Congress requires them to make explicit
choices which can then be subject to congressional review.
Fourth, Congress has more recently given itself authority to overrule
agency regulations in the Congressional Review Act.26 This act has been
used only once, having been used for the first time to remove just one of
Clinton's "midnight regulations" when the new Bush Administration and
Republican Congress took office in 2000. 27
All of these tools provide important political checks on agency
regulatory policy. Agencies must cooperate with Congress to receive
funding and to prevent restrictive riders in their appropriations bills.
Congressional committees can make agency personnel miserable by
subjecting them to harsh oversight hearings. These checks make possible
the existence of the agency discretion necessary to implement statutes.28
These political checks rely on the "repeated game" nature of agency,
interaction with Congress. The key aspect of a repeated game is the
existence of a continuing set of future interactions. For example, an agency
24. See Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., The Legislative History Of U.S. Air Pollution Control,
36 HOUSTON L. REV. 679, 708 (1999) (describing an automobile industry friendly bill
sponsored by Rep. John Dingell (D-Mich.), "who would become a major player in the air
pollution control field and a strong defender of the interests of the automobile industry").
25. 5 U.S.C. § 601-12 (2000).
26. 5 U.S.C. § 801-08 (2000).
27. See Kelli L. Dutrow, Comment, Working At Home at Your Own Risk: Employer
Liability for Teleworkers Under the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 18 GA. ST.
UNIV. L. REv. 955, 958 (2002) (noting that the first use was to overturn Clinton's OSHA
ergonomics regulations.)
28. Whether this is an appropriate accommodation is a different question. Forcing
Congress to take political responsibility directly by requiring it to legislate explicit
instructions to agencies could be a superior means of introducing political accountability.
See generally Indus. Union Dept., AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980)
(Rehnquist, J., concurring).
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that "defects" from an implicit political compromise this year risks
retaliation in next year's budget. Thus, in repeated games the choices made
by players (such as administrative agencies or Congress) today are
influenced not only by their estimation of the politically-relevant costs and
benefits of the particular choice they are making now, but also by their
view of how this choice will affect the payoffs from future choices.
29
When players expect to face each other in the future, the long-term impacts
of choices can dwarf the individual payoffs from any individual choice. 30
For the most part, agencies face a long-term future of interactions with
powerful members of Congress. During an administration, agencies must
cooperate with Congress to prevent congressional retaliation during the
remainder of that administration. Even when administrations change,
agencies often have powerful reasons to continue to cooperate. When a
president is prevented from succeeding himself by term limits, but is
succeeded by a president from the same party, agencies have little reason to
treat the lame duck period between the election and the incoming
administration as an end period, despite the absence of Congress from
Washington, D.C. in the post-election period. Even political appointees
have strong reasons to continue to play the repeated game, since both
political and career appointees can hope for places or career advancement
in the incoming administration, the appointees will not wish to complicate
the incoming administration's relations with Congress.
31
In one circumstance, however, agencies do have an incentive to defect.
When an administration is replaced by an administration of the opposing
party, the outgoing administration has little incentive to leave unfinished
business for the incoming administration. Oversight by Congress is also
weakened during this period: Congress is often out of session after the
elections, generally returning to Washington only for a brief "lame duck"
session to deal with particularly pressing matters.32 When party control of
a house is shifting with the election results, committee chairs and staff are
29. See FRED S. MCCHESNEY, MONEY FOR NOTHING: POLITICIANS, RENT EXTRACTION
AND POLITICAL EXTORTION (1997) (elaborating on this point).
30. See generally ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984).
31. Consider, for example, the controversial ergonomics regulation issued by the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration. "'If Gore had won the election, we
wouldn't have seen some of these come out,' says Randel Johnson, vice president of labor
and employee benefits at the Chamber of Commerce. 'Frankly, I think on ergonomics, if
Gore had clearly won, OSHA would have said, "Let's take a little more time with this."'
Deirdre Davidson & Jenna Greene, Clinton Regulators: Getting the Last Laugh, LEGAL
TIMES 24, Dec. 4, 2000, at 24.
32. See, e.g., Marie Cocco, Special Interests Soar in Lame-Duck Session, NEWSDAY,
Nov. 26, 2002, at A33 ("Lame-duck legislatures are wheezing, limping creatures, best
buried fast and forgotten quickly.").
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also in flux, minimizing the opportunity for oversight. In these
circumstances there is no "next period" reputation effect to limit the
behavior of the outgoing political appointees. Indeed, by issuing
regulations that complicate the life of the succeeding administration,
outgoing regulators can earn political capital with their core constituencies,
positioning themselves for rewards in post-administration jobs with interest
groups or in a future campaign or administration of their own party.
Agencies thus have an incentive to issue regulations during this period,
perhaps even holding controversial regulations until the lame duck period.
These last minute regulatory actions are often known as "midnight
regulations." Midnight regulations offer three significant defects,
according to Senior Federal Circuit Judge S. Jay Plager: (1) both incoming
and outgoing administrations expend enormous effort on reviewing and
creating the midnight regulations, with presidential oversight of agencies
often lost in the rush; 33 (2) the process leads to "sloppiness" and "makes
control of the regulatory apparatus appear to be a Washington game; '34 and
(3) the process undermines political accountability, with political
constraints on agency heads such as budgetary concerns, congressional
oversight, political appointees' concern with their reputations, and personal
performance measures absent in the period between the election and the
new administration.
35
The Clinton Administration made particularly heavy use of midnight
regulations. Many regulated entities saw the midnight regulations as
designed to punish the Administration's enemies and reward its friends.
36
The political director for the U.S. Chamber of Commerce summed up the
last weeks of the Clinton Administration as "a gift-wrapping party for his
most important and influential contributors" while the legislative director
for the Natural Resources Defense Council termed the Bush
33. Morrow, supra note 9, at 3; see also Douglas R. Cox, A Proposal for Addressing
Future 'Midnight Regulation,' 16(26) LEGAL BACKGROUNDER (Aug. 10, 2001) (noting that
midnight regulations "interfere with new Administration's ability to start with a clean slate
and to fashion and enforce its own agenda, consistent with its electoral mandate").
34. Morrow, supra note 9, at 3; see also Cox, supra note 33, at 16 (26) (terming them
"rushed, sloppy, and ill-considered initiatives").
35. Morrow, supra note 9, at 3; see also Cox, supra note 33, at 16 (26) (noting that
many midnight regulations would "never see the light of day if their drafters were to remain
in office to be held accountable for them").
36. See Peter H. Stone, Block Those Regs!, NAT'L J., Feb. 17, 2001, at 485 ("A key
message of the broad corporate lobbying campaign [against the midnight regulations] is that
the Clinton Administration acted capriciously and rammed through new rules and
regulations in its final days. Some critics bluntly charge that Clinton acted to punish
enemies and reward friends.").
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Administration's efforts to undue some of the midnight regulations as
political payoffs for campaign contributors.3 In particular, outgoing
Interior Secretary Bruce Babbitt issued midnight regulations that
significantly changed the regulatory climate for hardrock mining
companies. The heavily publicized (and criticized) pardons issued by
President Clinton at the end of his second term are another example of this
phenomenon.
38
II. REGULATING HARD ROCK MINING
Understanding the controversy over the Clinton Administration's
midnight regulations of hardrock mining requires some background on the
mining industry and mining law. This section provides a brief overview of
each before addressing the midnight regulations.
A. Hardrock Mining & The Regulatory Process
For many, mining conjures up images of the California Gold Rush of
1848-1849 and the later mineral rushes of the 19th century West: grizzled
prospectors armed with pick, pan, and mule. The reality is that relatively
little mining ever conformed to this stereotype because much of America's
mineral resources lie deep below the surface of the earth, requiring
extensive capital and effort to locate, remove, and process. Mineral
deposits "are generally concealed, offer complex metallurgy, and produce
large quantities of waste material. 3 9 The mineral desired is distributed
throughout the ore and must be separated. Methods range from gravity
separation to hydrometallurgical processes, where ores are treated with
chemicals to dissolve out desired metals. For example, one of the most
effective means of extracting gold from ore uses cyanide solutions to
remove the gold.40 The development of this process has allowed mining of
ores with much lower concentrations of gold, sparking some critics of the
Mining Law to argue that the 1980's and 1990's were a new gold rush.4'
Hardrock mining is far more time consuming and expensive than the
49ers' pans and picks. Mining has also become a heavily capital-intensive
37. Larry Lipman, Bush Reversals of Clinton Regulations Draw Ire, Praise, PALM
BEACH POST, Apr. 1, 2001, at IA.
38. See, e.g., Josh Getlin, Clinton Pardons a Billionaire Fugitive, and Questions
Abound, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2001, at Al (examining specifically the pardon of
commodities trader Marc Rich).
39. Willard Lacy, An Introduction to Geology and Hard Rock Mining, Rocky
Mountain Mineral Law Foundation, Science and Technology Series No. 1, 49 (1998),
available at http://www.rmmIf.org/SciTech/Lacy/lacy.htm.
40. Id. at 136.
41. See, e.g., Wald & French, supra note 4, at 68.
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industry. "Modem hardrock mineral exploration requires a continuous
effort using vast tracts of land and sophisticated and expensive
technology. 42 From discovery it takes, on average, ten years to develop a
new mine in the United States. .' Locating a target site for further
exploration can cost $150,000-$250,000; determining whether to proceed
to extraction can cost an additional $500,000-$ 1,000,000.
44
In 1998, the Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation summed up the
characteristics of a modern mine as: "no freedom of site selection;"
requiring "considerable lead time and ... often risky long-term investment,
planning, and projection;" and "costly."45 The Foundation described the
industry as cyclical; new mines as "more marginal economic ventures than
46
existing mines;" and having a trend toward fewer but larger mines.
Modem American mining law began with the California Gold Rush.
The boom in mineral exploration touched off by the discovery of gold at
Sutter's Mill in 1848 led tens of thousands of miners to scour the western
United States for mineral deposits throughout the mid-1800's. Searching
for minerals in the newly acquired and largely empty areas of the West,
early prospectors rarely took time to seek formal title to the land they
explored.47 When Congress finally addressed the issue in 1866 they had
little choice but to ratify existing claims and methods of mineral location
and exploitation. 48 The 1866 mining law, and the revised version passed in
1872, recognized both the early miners' methods of locating claims, and
their right to explore and claim minerals from the federal public land
without paying royalties or significant fees to the federal government. 49 As
the American Law of Mining summarized,
In essence, the location system provides that the first mineral claimant who finds a
valuable mineral deposit on vacant, unappropriated, unreserved, and non-withdrawn
public domain, and who locates a mining claim and diligently pursues the find, is
42. Humphries and Vincent, supra note 3.
43. Lacy, supra note 39, at 63.
44. Id. at 64.
45. AMERICAN LAW OF MINING 1-15 (Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation ed.,
1998).
46. Id. at 1-15 - 1-16.
47. See generally Andrew P. Morriss, Miners, Vigilantes, & Cattlemen, Overcoming
Free Rider Problems in the Private Provisions of Law, 33 LAND & WATER L. REv. 581
(1998).
48. The primary issue in the debate was over whether there should be a return to the
federal treasury from mineral deposits, favored by Eastern interests, or open access, favored
by Western interests. See AMERICAN LAW OF MINING, supra note 45, at 4-7; see also LESHY,
supra note 5, at 14-15 (describing adoption of 1866 mining law).
49. See Morriss, supra note 47, at 616-19 (describing displacement of miners' law by
government law).
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protected against rivals, is entitled to produce all the minerals from the deposit
without being required to purchase fee simple title from the United States or make
other payment, and, if he chooses, is entitled to obtain fee simple title by means of a
patent issued by the United States government.
50
Despite the "free" resources, mining claims did not result in mass
privatization of federal land and the "giveaway" aspect appears overstated
by the Mining Law's critics. Patents under the 1872 statute and its
predecessors privatized approximately 3.3 million acres from 1867 through
2000, only 1.5% of all public lands patented under the various federal land
disposal laws.5 1 Although the scope of the Mining Law has been
significantly reduced over time through the withdrawal of particular lands
and minerals from it,52 "[f]or those hardrock minerals that remain under the
Mining Law, however, the claim-patent system is essentially the same as it
was when the law was enacted. 5 3 Even a small fee can dramatically affect
the number of mineral claims.Imposition of a $100 per claim annual
maintenance fee to keep the claim led to a drop from 1.2 million claims in
fiscal 1989 to 294,678 in fiscal 1993.54 This suggests that there are large
numbers of relatively marginal claims.55 Finally, access to federal land is
an important part of a domestic minerals industry. With much of the
western half of the United States owned by the federal government (87% of
Nevada, for example) and much of the hardrock mineral deposits located in
the West, access to federal lands for mining is the only way to have a
domestic minerals industry. To the extent that the national security
50. AMERICAN LAW OF MINING, supra note 45, at 30-3.
51. Id
52. Id. (describing various federal lands (including approximately 165 million acres of
the 700 million acres under BLM jurisdiction in 2000) and particular minerals (e.g. oil, gas,
oil shale, phosphates, sodium) that have been withdrawn from the claim-patent system,
reducing the scope of the claim-patent system).
53. Id.
54. Id.; see also The Effect of Federal Mining Fees and Proposed Federal Royalties on
State and Local Revenues and the Mining Industry: Field Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Energy and Mineral Res. of the House Comm. on Res., 106th Cong., 26 (1999) (statement of
Ronald L. Parratt, Commissioner, Commission on Mineral Resources, State of Nevada)
(noting that $100 claim fee introduced in 1993 led to reduction of active mining claims in
Nevada from 330,000 to 140,000).
55. Humphries and Vincent, supra note 3. Such holdings may be speculative or reflect
the economics of a claim's development under current market conditions. See id., supra
note 3 ("Critics believe that many claims are held for speculative purposes."). Leshy argued
that such claims were being held as a means of "extortion" from mining companies and
government bodies that sought to make other uses of the land involved. See LESHY, supra
note 5, at 78 ("Even if you have not turned a spadeful of dirt looking for minerals, and have
spent only a modest sum, it is often cheaper for the mining company or government to pay
you to extinguish your claim than it is for them to crank up the costly, unwieldy machinery
to contest it. In the process you can net a nice piece of change.").
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arguments for domestic sources of minerals are valid, this is increasingly
important.
Even more than when the Mining Law was originally passed in 1872,
mining activity has become a regional economic issue. Today, most of the
mining activity and mineral claims under the 1872 statute are located in
Arizona, California, Montana, Nevada, and Wyoming.56 Nevada alone had
approximately 45% of the claims at the end of fiscal year 2000. 57 This
regional nature of the industry has important political consequences, since
most of the direct economic benefits (mining jobs, for example) are located
in a few sparsely populated western states. Since supporters of the Mining
Law contend that it provides necessary incentives for the expense of
exploration and development of mineral resources, 58 these arguments are
increasingly difficult to sell to those whose constituents lack a direct stake
in the industry. As a result, mining issues offer congressional
representatives from non-mining states a "free" vote "in favor" of "the
environment." 59
Unlike the California Gold Rush, where every state had plenty of
residents hoping to strike it rich in mines, mines today are often seen
outside their home states as environmental dangers. For non-westemers in
general, and non-residents of the five main mining states in particular,
increasingly stringent environmental regulation of mining can be portrayed
as "pro-environment" action. Indeed, modem critics of the Mining Law
generally argue that the 1872 law is "obsolete and inconsistent with other
56. Humphries and Vincent, supra note 3.
57. Id.
58. Humphries and Vincent, supra note 3 ("Industry officials argue that being able to
obtain full and clear title to the land enhances a company's ability to bring an economic
deposit into production; financing the project, for example, may be more feasible. They
contend that restrictions on free access and security of tenure would curtail exploration
efforts among large and small mining firms. In their view, the incentive to develop would
be lost, long-run costs would increase, and the industry and the country would suffer.").
59. See Hardrock Mining Issues: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Energy and
Mineral Res. of the House Comm. on Res., 105th Cong. 3 (Statement of Rep. Barbara
Cubin) (1997) [hereinafter 1997 Hearings] (noting "the folks who want to see the industry
leave the U.S. altogether are winning the public relations wars, so the mail to the Eastern
representatives and Midwestern Members of Congress is routinely against efforts to restore
the multiple use concepts and multiple use for public lands."); Christine Dorsey, Mining
Rules Gain Support, LAS VEGAS REv. J., June 13, 2001, at ID (noting group of eastern
Republican congresspeople had written letter to support midnight 3809 regulations and the
response from western republicans, such as Jim Gibbons (R-Nev.), head the House Mining
Caucus, was "[w]hen it comes to mining, some of these people have been so persuaded by
environmental groups to take these radical positions that they will not listen to me. They're
listening to the threats by some environmental groups about their campaigns and their
election").
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federal natural resource policies. '60 Non-westerners also tend to see the
mineral resources as "taxpayer assets" which should generate revenue for
61Sicththe government. Since the mining interests are not paying "market value"
for these resources, increasing mining interests' costs through
environmental standards and taxes is often seen by non-westerners as
appropriate.
Consider, for example, the controversy surrounding the New World
mine outside Yellowstone National Park. A proposal to build a mine on
Henderson Mountain in Montana to extract $700 million in gold, silver,
and copper drew criticism because of perceived threats from its waste
disposal system to rivers in Yellowstone.62 The mining operation offered
benefits to those who would receive work at the mine; the problems it
posed drew concern from around the nation and globe, with a U.N. World
Heritage Committee visiting the site.63 The conflict was solved by a
federal buyout of the company's mining rights.
64
The New World story has an important moral. The threat to
Yellowstone was eliminated by the purchase of the mining company's
property rights-in theory offering a means of forcing those who sought to
protect the park to bear the costs of their actions. Unfortunately, however,
opponents of the mine were able to use public money to accomplish their
60. Humphries and Vincent, supra note 3 ("Mining Law critics consider the claim-
patent system a giveaway of publicly owned resources because of the absence of royalties
and the small charges associated with keeping a claim active and obtaining a patent. They
maintain that although such generous terms may have been effective ways to help settle the
West and develop minerals, there is no solid evidence that under a different system minerals
would not be developed today. They also believe that the current system, by conveying title
and allowing other uses of patented lands, creates difficult land management problems
through the creation of inholdings, and that current law does not provide for adequate
protection of the environment."). Efforts to change the Mining Law have a long history.
See, e.g., Wald & French, supra note 4, at 68 ("Efforts to reform the 1872 Law have been
going on for almost as long as it has been on the books. Reports criticizing the Law began
appearing as early as the 1930s.").
61. See, e.g., Miscellaneous Mining Bills: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Forests
and Public Land Mgmt. of the Senate Comm. on Energy and Natural Res., 105th Cong. 66
(1998) (Statement of Jill Lancelot, Legislative Director, Taxpayers for Common Sense)
[hereinafter 1998 Hearings].
62. See New World Cacophony, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 14, 1995, at 30 (discussing a
proposal to dump waste products from the mine into a lake 10,000 feet up the mountain).
63. See id.; see also Jeremy Rabkin, The Yellowstone Affair: Environmental
Protection, International Treaties, and National Sovereignty, Competitive Enterprise
Institute (May 1, 1997), at http://www.cei.org/gencon/025,02288.cfm.
64. See Deal to Prevent YellowstoneMmineCclose to Being Sealed, CNNinteractive,
(Mar. 4, 1998), at http://www.cnn.com/EARTHI9803/04/mine.deal/ (referring to an
exchange of $65 million for divestiture of the mine to federal control); Mining Firm Hands
Deed to Yellowstone, DENVER POST, Sept. 20, 1998, at B7, available at 1998 WL 18525214.
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goal-thus spreading the cost across all taxpayers, not merely those who
cared about the threat the mine posed to Yellowstone National Park. The
mining law's grant of property rights may be criticized as a poor means of
privatizing public property, but it nonetheless led to a solution in which
those who theoretically benefited from the restriction of mining (i.e. the
general public) bore the cost of doing so. 6 5  (Of course, the actual
beneficiaries were a subset of the public as a whole, since not all
Americans were concerned about the mine.) Not surprisingly, the ability of
the mining company to locate near Yellowstone became "a major focus of
the national campaign to reform the 1872 mining law, 66 since even such
partial property rights solutions are unpopular with those who prefer not to
pay to implement their preferences.
One more factor is important in understanding the regulatory story told
in this paper. In 1976, the Federal Land Policy and Management Act
(FLMPA) 67 made a significant modification to treatment of public lands
under the Mining Law, vastly expanding federal regulatory involvement by
granting the Secretary of the Interior authority to regulate the surface
impacts of hard rock mining.68 Although the initial regulatory efforts did
little more than codify existing practices and require compliance with
generally applicable environmental laws and rules, the FLPMA opened the
door to more aggressive regulatory action in the late 1990's. Perhaps
anticipating this, opposition to the Act in the Senate came entirely from
65. Of course, eliminating mining operations in the U.S. merely raises the price of
mineral resources, thus leading to increased demand for sources of the resources located
outside the U.S. As a result, mining increases in places like Indonesia where environmental
controls are less strict than in the U.S. The net benefit to the environment of the New World
buyout is thus not clearly positive. See, e.g., 1998 Hearings, supra note 61, at 2-4
(statement of Hon. Frank H. Murkowski) (describing how the industry moves "offshore"
when regulatory impact increases).
66. Rocky Barker, Gold Mining in Paradise, POST REGISTER, Mar. 26, 1992, available
at http://www.idahonews.com/yellowst/badmine.htm.
67. 43 U.S.C. § 1701-1782 (2000).
68. To get a sense of the scope of the changes introduced by the FLMPA, consider
Leshy's description of the Mining Law in his 1987 book: access to public lands under the
Mining Law "was seemingly unregulated, in that the statute gave the federal government as
landowner no explicit monitoring or supervisory role and, indeed, no formal means of
learning what activity was taking place on its lands pursuant to the Mining Law." LESHY,
supra note 5, at 26. Leshy may be overstating the case a bit - certainly the federal
government as landowner had available to it the same common law tools as any landowner
to resist damage caused by mineral rights owners, but the general point is correct that prior
to the FLPMA, the government had no clear authority to introduce regulatory measures via
agency action.
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western senators.69 Most importantly, the FLPMA for the first time granted
a federal agency direct authority to regulate hardrock mining activity on
claims made on public lands for reasons other than simply managing the
claims process.70 Section 1732(b) required the Secretary of the Interior "by
regulation or otherwise, [to] take any action necessary to prevent
unnecessary or undue degradation of the lands.",71 Exactly what the act
meant by "unnecessary or undue degradation" was left undefined by both
the statute and its legislative history.72 .
The FLPMA thus introduced two important elements into the hardrock
mining industry that would help create later problems.73 First, it created
space for more expansive regulations 74 that addressed issues other than the
claims process itself7" and led to increases in the resources available to
BLM to enforce regulations.76 By broadening the potential involvement of
the federal government, the FLPMA sparked interest in mining regulation
with those outside the mining community. In particular, environmental
pressure groups could now use the Secretary of the Interior's regulatory
powers under the FLPMA to achieve their goals with respect to public
69. See Charles Wallace Miller, Jr., Sacred Cow in the American West: the Origin,
Evolution, Administration, and Impact of Federal Hardrock Mining Laws and Policies 366
(1990) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, The Union Institute) (noting vote was 78-1 1 in the
Senate and that all opposition came from mining state senators in the West).
70. The General Mining Law of 1872 had provided that public lands be open to
exploration and purchase "under regulations prescribed by law." 30 U.S.C. § 22 (2000).
This provision did not authorize environmental regulations of mining claims.
71. 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b) (2000).
72. James Butler, Mining on Federal Lands Current Issues-Changes to BLM's 3809
Regulations, SG039 ALI-ABA 167, 169 (2001) (noting that subsequent examination of the
original regulations determined no clarification was necessary).
73. The FLPMA also provided important benefits to the mining industry. It limited
presidential power to withdraw lands from mineral exploration. See LESHY, supra note 5, at
36-37. It also introduced federal recording of claims that some in the mining industry
supported as a means of eliminating abandoned claims and improving security of title. See
LESHY, supra note 5, at 81-82.
74. See, e.g., Hard Rock Mining, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Mineral Res. Dev.
and Production of the Senate Comm. on Energy and Natural Res., 10 1st Cong. 36 (April 19,
1990) [hereinafter Jamison] (statement of Cy Jamison, Director of BLM) ("With enactment
of the various environmental laws.., and the development of the NEPA process, BLM's
administration of the mining laws has changed, particularly since enactment of FLPMA.").
75. See LESHY, supra note 5, at 220 (noting agencies have been given "a substantial
degree of environmental regulatory authority").
76. See MILLER, supra note 69, at 374 (noting that the FLPMA "had given the BLM
more administrative power over mining claims and more personnel to enforce its
regulations" and that BLM personnel went from 4,200 before the act to 10,000 by 1979);
Jamison, supra note 74, at 29 (noting that BLM funding for surface management activities
under the mining law went from 10% of appropriated funds for mining programs in fiscal
year 1982 to more than 40% in 1990).
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lands indirectly. They could not have done this (or it would have at least
been much costlier to do) with the Mining Law's single focus on disposing
of mineral resources located on federal land.
Second, the FLPMA left key terms undefined, creating a valuable
resource for the "owner" of the authority to define those terms, in this case
the Secretary of the Interior. Given the broad mandates for Interior and the
broad regulatory powers of the Secretary of the Interior, individual
industries, such as the mining industry, were in a poor position to compete
for control of the department.77 Those same broad powers, however, made
the position attractive and valuable to those with broad agendas for public
lands. Environmental pressure groups thus focused on the Interior as
critical to advancing their agenda.78 As John Leshy noted in his book on
the Mining Law, as a result of pressure from environmental groups,
agencies "set their lawyers off to search for the authorities" to justify
regulatory action and, unsurprisingly, found them.79
As a result of the changes embodied in the FLPMA, in general
77. "Buying" the entire department was too expensive for those interested only in a
particular rule or regulation. Those interested in the entire panoply of powers held by
Interior could, on the other hand, "afford" to buy the department, since their purchase would
get them multiple means of advancing their interests. Note that the terms "buy" and
"afford" need not imply outright bribery, but merely that interest groups with broad agendas
will be willing to invest more in capturing political resources that match their agenda since
the return will be greater. For elaboration on this point, see David Schoenbrod, Goals
Statutes or Rules Statutes: The Case of the Clean Air Act, 30 UCLA LAw. REv. 740, 824
(1983):
First, one could be a national hero by purporting to protect health forever. Who could
object without being a kill-joy? Second, when the consequences of the law became
clear, and the need to incur costs and stop activities in order to comply became
apparent, one could then play hero at home by opposing the application of the Act in
the local context. Next, as industry and governors came to Washington for relief, and
as environmentalists complained that EPA was not doing enough, one could play
statesman and dole out compromises requiring EPA to go through new procedures
and write new reports. The same politician could play all roles, protector of nature in
national forums and savior of the local economy at home.
78. See, e.g., Rudy Abramson, Environmentalists Get Their Wish: Babbitt Named as
Interior Secretary Reform: Improved Prospects Are Seen for Western Water, New
Wilderness Areas, Protection of Park Land-and the Endangered Spotted Owl, Los
ANGELES TIMES, December 25, 1992, at A39 ("[E]nvironmentalists on Thursday got what
they most wanted from their Santa Claus in Little Rock, Ark.: Bruce Babbitt as secretary of
the Interior."); Michael Milstein, Interior, Ag Nominees to Have Big Effect: Babbitt Seen as
Environmentalist, BrLLINGS GAZETTE (MONTANA), December 25, 1992, available at 1992
WL 3355701 ("Environmentalists in the West were beaming Thursday at the news that
President-elect Bill Clinton had nominated Bruce Babbitt to run the Interior Department.").
79. LESHY, supra note 5, at 196.
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environmental regulatory laws that affect mining, 80 and in various
withdrawals of federal land from Mining Law coverage, free access to
federal lands "no longer means what it meant in 1872. It does not apply at
all to substantial portions of the federal domain. Where it does continue to
apply, it is a mere shadow of its former self."81 The Mining Law applies to
a smaller set of public lands and claims under it are subject to more
regulation than they were before the FPLMA.
In sum, the hardrock mining industry presents a classic example of an
industry vulnerable to majoritarian oppression. The industry is
concentrated in a few sparsely populated (and thus politically weak)
states,82 has large assets tied to specific locations, and long time lines for
projects. Additionally, the mining industry can be made to bear the brunt
of politically popular "pro-environmental" regulations and other
administrative actions, whose indirect costs will be virtually imperceptible
to the consumers; concealed within the final price of the products
containing the minerals mined. Key gaps in statutory regulatory structures
make these very actions possible..
The industry's ability to resist such regulation is dependent upon the
design of the United States Senate, whose rules magnify the ability of a few
senators to block actions of the majority, thereby protecting vulnerable
minorities. 83 During normal times, when agencies are held in check by the
political constraints imposed through Congress, the mining industry has
some ability to withstand regulatory pressure. 4  Through politically
powerful senators, such as Nevada's Harry Reid, deputy majority leader
during the period of Democratic control of the Senate from 2001 to 2002,
the industry was able to hold back the Clinton Administration's willingness
to sacrifice western interests for environmental regulatory measures
80. See id. at 186-89 (describing impact of general environmental laws on mining
activities).
81. See id., at 29. There was an attempt at altering the Mining Law in the 1970's as
well. After passage of the FLPMA, the Carter Administration promoted reform. However,
mishandling by Arizona Congressman Morris Udall doomed the efforts to promote a new
mining law and stalled efforts at change. See MILLER, supra note 69, at 369-72 (describing
Udall's efforts and their impact).
82. Nevada asserted, for example, that it would bear most of the direct costs of the
imposition of the midnight 3809 regulations discussed below. See Mining Claims Under the
General Mining Laws; Surface Management, 66 Fed. Reg. 54,834, 54,835 (Oct. 30 2001).
83. Lisa 0. Monaco, Comment, Give The People What They Want: The Failure Of
"Responsive" Lawmaking, 3 U. CHm. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 735, 748 (1996) ("[T]he
Congress, particularly the Senate, is governed by rules which make it easier to block
legislation than to enact it.
84. See, e.g., 1997 Hearings, supra note 59 (discussing the use of appropriations riders
to control the 3809 rulemaking process).
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popular in the more populous eastern states. 85 Once the end game began
however, the Senate no longer provided protection.
B. The 1980 Hard Rock Regulations
Prior to the FLPMA, there was little need for rules other than
"housekeeping" rules that gave details of how to file claims and the like.
The American Law of Mining described the requirements as "de
minimus."86  The FLPMA "drastically" changed the requirements by
introducing initial and annual filing requirements that would result in loss
of the claim if not followed.8 7 In addition, once the FLPMA introduced
multiple goals into federal lands management, mining claims had to be
balanced against other goals for federal lands. The point is not that the
federal regulators prevented massive environmental destruction, but that
the FLPMA created a new regulatory set of tools that codified existing
practices and clarified the requirements for mineral rights owners on
federal lands. Initially, these new tools had a relatively benign impact.
However, once the tools existed they created the opportunity for "policy
entrepreneurs" 88 to use them to further their own interests.
Known as the "3809 Regulations" for their location in the Code of
Federal Regulations, this first round of final rules issued by the BLM under
the FLPMA sought to achieve two objectives for BLM. First, the
regulations wanted to protect federal lands from "unnecessary or undue
degradation," as mandated by the statute, and second, the regulations
sought to obtain "information that would allow the Bureau of Land
Management to know where mining operations are occurring on Federal
lands and some knowledge of the extent of those operations" to facilitate
"long term planning decisions and multiple use trade offs for all resource
values . ,89
The regulations divided mining activities into categories based on the
size of the claim and the types of activities conducted. Activities by part-
time miners and prospectors that caused only "negligible" surface
85. See, e.g., Tom Kenworthy and Paul Overberg, How the Mountain West Was Won
by the GOP; Affluent Suburbanites Fleeing California have Made Region the Biggest
Republican Bastion, USA TODAY, October 28, 2002, at A 1, available at 2002 WL 4736347
(attributing shift to GOP to an influx of migrants from California).
86. AMERICAN LAW OF MINING, supra note 45, at 4-22.
87. Id. at 4-22.
88. A "policy entrepreneur" is one who creates new public policies, much as a
traditional entrepreneur is one who creates new goods or services.
89. Surface Management of Public Lands Under U.S. Mining Laws, 45 Fed. Reg.
78,902, 78,902 (November 26, 1980) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 3800).
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disturbance required no notice. 90 Claims that required the operator to
disturb less than five acres of public land simply required notice to the
BLM. 91 Claims that would disturb five or more acres of public land
required submission of a plan for the mining activity to BLM for review
and approval.9 z In addition to the claim size distinction, certain activities,
including claim location activities and nonmotorized access, were defined
as "casual use" and allowed without notice to BLM regardless of the size.
93
For environmental standards, the 1980 regulations incorporated
environmental standards from other state and federal environmental and
mining reclamation laws and regulations.94 This incorporation meant that
as those other laws and regulations changed, the environmental standards in
the mining regulations also changed automatically. 95  In addition to
compliance with these external standards, the 1980 regulations also
required operators to comply with a "prudent operator in usual, customary,
and proficient operations" standard with respect to surface disturbance, 96 to
97 98reclaim disturbed areas, and to implement mitigation measures. The
major change made between the proposed and final versions of the 3809
regulations was the reduction of regulatory burdens for smaller operations
through the exemptions from the plan requirements based on the size of the
operation.
99
This first set of mining regulations did not significantly change practice
under the Mining Law but simply expanded the regulatory scope of the
Interior's activities to match the new law's requirements. Perhaps because
environmental pressure groups were still busy with the passage of major
Id. at 78,910-11 (exempting casual use and defining it as not involving explosives,
mechanical earthmoving equipment, or use of motorized vehicles in areas designated as
closed to such vehicles) (for convenience, the 1980 regulations are cited to the Federal
Register in which they appeared, even though they have now been superseded in the Code of
Federal Regulations).
91. Id. at 78,911.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 78,910.
94. Id. at 78,913.
95. This approach was criticized by Mining Law opponents as leaving the environment
"at the mercy of a patchwork of Federal, State, and local regulations." 1998 Hearings,
supra note 61, at 46 (statement of Stephen D'Esposito, President, Mineral Policy Center).
See also Wald & French, supra note 4, at 79 ("Today mines are subject to a hodgepodge of
federal, state, and local regulations-but no uniform standards designed to protect the
environment.").
96. 43 C.F.R. § 3809.0-5(k) (1998).
97. Surface Management of Public Lands Under U.S. Mining Laws, 45 Fed. Reg. at
78,910 (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 3800).
98. Id
99. Id. at 78,902.
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environmental statutes in the late 1970's and because public lands issues
had not yet come to their attention as a focus for regulatory activity, BLM's
initial FLPMA regulations made use of common sense approaches such as
the five acre distinction and the incorporation of existing federal
environmental standards without drawing much attention.
However, as environmental pressure groups began to focus their efforts
on federal land policy, the 3809 regulations came under increased scrutiny
and attack. In addition, starting in. 1986, the General Accounting Office
began issuing a series of critical reports on the mining law and BLM's
regulations.' ° The GAO criticized BLM for failing to ensure reclamation
of mine sites t° ' which led to substantial costs for federal and state
reclamation efforts,'0 2 and the Mining Law as "inconsistent" with federal
land policies. 10 3 Opponents of the Mining Law requested some of the GAO
reports,'0 4 including Congressman Nick Rahall, chair of the House
Subcommittee on Mining and Natural Resources, as part of his campaign to
change the law.'05
BLM's responded to the political pressure by shifting its focus toward
100. See, e.g., U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUBLIC LANDS: INTERIOR SHOULD
ENSURE AGAINST ABUSES FROM HARDROCK MINING, GAO/RCED-86-48 (1986); U.S.
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FEDERAL LAND MANAGEMENT: LIMITED ACTION TO
RECLAIM HARDROCK MINE SITES, GAO/RCED-88-21 (1987); U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, FEDERAL LAND MANAGEMENT: AN ASSESSMENT OF HARDROCK MINING DAMAGE,
GAO/RCED-88-123BR (1988); U.S GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FEDERAL LAND
MANAGEMENT: THE MINING LAW OF 1872 NEEDS REvISION, GAO/RCED-89-72 (1989).
101. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FEDERAL LAND MANAGEMENT: LIMITED
ACTION TO RECLAIM HARDROCK MINE SITES, GAO/RCED-88-21 4-5 (1987) (noting failure
of BLM to contact mine site operators to require cleanup).
102. See, e.g., GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FEDERAL LAND MANAGEMENT: AN
ASSESSMENT OF HARDROCK MINING DAMAGE, GAO/RCED-88-123BR 1 (1988) (estimating
cost of $284 million to reclaim 281,581 acres of federal land).
103. See, e.g., U.S.GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FEDERAL LAND MANAGEMENT: THE
MINING LAW OF 1872 NEEDS REVISION, GAO/RCED-89-72 22 (1989).
104. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FEDERAL LAND MANAGEMENT: LIMITED
ACTION TO RECLAIM HARDROCK MINE SITES, GAOIRCED-88-21 1 (1987) (noting report
requested by Rep. Mike Synar).
105. See, e.g., U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FEDERAL LAND MANAGEMENT: AN
ASSESSMENT OF HARDROCK MINING DAMAGE, GAO/RCED-88-123BR 1 (1988) (letter from
James Duffus, Associate Director of the GAO, to Congressman Rahall, reporting on GAO's
investigations done at his request); U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FEDERAL LAND
MANAGEMENT: THE MINING LAW OF 1872 NEEDS REvISION, GAO/RCED-89-72 1 (1989)
(letter from J. Dexter Peach, Assistant Comptroller General of the GAO, noting that report
done in response to Rahall's request); MILLER, supra note 69, at 388 (noting Rahall had
requested GAO report on mining law).
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environmental issues. 10 6 The agency formed a task force in 1989 to review
the 3809 regulations. The task force ultimately recommended regulatory
changes in four areas: bonding of exploration and mining; managing the
use of cyanide in operations; reclamation; and addressing abandoned mines
from before the institution of the 3809 regulations. 0 7  BLM adopted
consistent national policies and proposed rules to address these areas. For
example, BLM released a reclamation handbook in February 1992 that set
out "nationwide standards as a basis for site-specific reclamation
requirements.' '0 8 The task force recommendations were, however, "put on
hold because it appeared that pending changes in the Mining Law would
supersede any changes in the surface management regulations."'
10 9
BLM also supplemented its national regulations and policies with "more
detailed guidance developed at the BLM State Office level, frequently in
cooperation with state mining regulatory agencies.""10  Perhaps most
importantly, BLM issued a notice of intent to revise the 3809
regulations."' The notice listed seven major areas of concern that BLM
was examining, including whether the definition of "unnecessary or undue
degradation" needed to be revised, and whether additional environmental
requirements were necessary.' 2 However, all work on 3809 rulemaking
came to a halt with the new Clinton Administration.1'
3
C. The Failed Legislative "Reform " of the early 1990's
When the Clinton Administration took office in 1993, it endorsed the
idea of legislative "reform" of the 1872 law." 4 Clinton appointees at the
Interior included several well-known advocates of changes to the 1872 act.
Most notable were Secretary Bruce Babbitt, who termed the Mining Law
106. See Jamison, supra note 74, at 29 ("In the past BLM's administration of the mining
laws has been mainly concerned with location, recordation, and some patenting. In recent
years we have been increasingly emphasizing surface management, including inspection and
enforcement.").
107. See U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Land Management, Surface
Management Regulations for Locatable Mineral Operations (43 CFR 3809), Draft
Environmental Impact Statement 2 (February 1999) [hereinafter Draft EIS]; Butler, supra
note 72, at 171.
108. U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Land Management, Solid Minerals
Reclamation Handbook, BLM Manual Handbook H-3042-1 1-1 (1992).
109. Draft EIS, supra note 107, at 2.
110. Butler, supra note 72, at 171.
11. Surface Management Regulations, 56 Fed. Reg. 54815 (October 23, 1991) (to be
codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 3800).
112. Id. at 54,815-16.
113. Butler, supra note 72, at 172.
114. Garver & Squillace, supra note 18, at 14-4 - 14-5.
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"an obscene example of corporate welfare,"'"15 John Leshy, author of a
book critical of the act, The Mining Law: A Study in Perpetual Motion,' 1
6
appointed as solicitor for the department, and Jim Baca, a New Mexico
public lands official and mining law critic, appointed to head BLM.
17
Interior Secretary Bruce Babbitt had a "reform" agenda that involved six
major changes to the 1872 law: (1) an end to patenting of mining claims;
(2) royalties for the federal government; (3) increased discretion for
removal of land from mineral exploration; (4) increased authority for BLM
to impose environmental standards; (5) funding for cleaning up abandoned
mine sites; and (6) additional enforcement power."
8
During the 103d Congress, mining law bills passed the House 19 and
Senate, 20 with the House bill favoring environmental pressure groups' and
Babbitt's positions, while the Senate bill favored the industry's position.
1 21
The conference committee to reconcile the two bills was thus critical.
During the late spring, summer, and early fall of 1994, Senator [Bennett]
Johnston negotiated with House Democrats, western senators,
environmental groups, the mining industry, and the Interior Department in
an attempt to draft legislation that would be approved by a majority of the
members of the Conference Committee, survive votes on the House and
Senate floors, and be supported by the President. Despite Senator
Johnston's considerable effort and influence, the Conference Committee
failed to agree on a mining law bill. With the 1994 congressional elections
looming, neither the House Democrats nor the western senators could
accept Chairman Johnston's final proposal.'22
After the elections gave control of both houses to the Republicans, new
115. T.H. Watkins, Hard Rock Legacy, 197 NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC 76, 78 (March
2000).
116. LESHY, supra note 5.
117. Garver & Squillace, supra note 18, at 14-5.
118. Id. at 14-6.
119. H.R. 322, 103d Congress (1st Sess. 1993).
120. S. 775, 103d Congress (1st Sess. 1993).
121. The regional nature of the hardrock mining industry noted earlier explains this
outcome: extracting revenue from the mining industry at the cost of jobs and investment
would be popular among non-mining states since they would share in the revenue but not in
the burdens imposed. The House, where the five mining states would have proportionately
fewer representatives than in the Senate, would thus be more likely to tilt toward the
position of environmental pressure groups than the Senate, where mining state interests
were better represented. See, e.g., Christian Bourge, The End of 'Modern American
Mining'? 107 AMERICAN METAL MARKET 1 (1999) ("A high-ranking House source close to
the issue [a rider concerning the millsite opinion] said the vote showed that the issue was a
geographic one, with the rural West losing.").
122. Garver & Squillace, supra note 18, at 14-7.
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mining legislation was introduced and included in the 1995 Budget Bill. 23
The Administration rejected the changes on the grounds that they did "little
or nothing to fix the problems posed by the current law.' ', 24 After President
Clinton vetoed that bill, legislative change efforts died and the
administration turned to administrative efforts to achieve its policy
objectives. 2 '
The politics of mining law change in the Clinton-Gore Administration
are easily understood. Environmentalists were an important part of
Clinton's base of support while he had little hope of gaining significant
support in the West among those favorable to mining. The administration
regularly used Western lands issues to gain support in the East among
urban voters concerned with "the environment" - as when the
administration created several new national monuments in Utah without
consulting with state officials on their boundaries. 26  In addition, the
administration contained many environmental ideologues. 27  Subjecting
mining operations on federal land to more stringent environmental
regulation would cost Clinton and Gore, who built their reelection strategy
for 1996 in part around environmental issues, support of those connected
with the mining industry in western states, support they were unlikely to
win anyway. The regulations, however, would gain them support of "pro-
environment" voters in the more important Midwestern and Eastern states.
Western senators, on the other hand, had little incentive to bargain with the
administration, since the existing mining law offered mining interests more
than they were likely to retain in any compromise. By blocking change,
Western senators could deliver more benefits to their constituents
123. See BALANCED BUDGET ACT OF 1995, HR. CONF. REP. 104-350 §§ 5371-5382
(1995). Clinton cited the proposed revision of the mining law as one of the reasons for his
veto. See The President's Radio Address, Pub. Papers 1719 (November 4, 1995) (The
budget "allows a giveaway of mining rights to companies at a fraction of their worth. Just
recently, a law on the books since 1872 that I am trying hard to change forced the
Government to sell minerals worth $1 billion to a private company for $275. That is
taxpayer robbery, and it's going to keep right on happening under the Republican budget.").
124. 1998 Hearings, supra note 61, at 23 (statement of the Hon. Bruce Babbitt,
Secretary, Department of the Interior). See also id. at 26 ("[F]rankly, we would prefer no
legislation on environmental regulations to [the bills in the Senate].").
125. Garver & Squillace, supra note 18, at 14-7 to 14-8. Some legislative efforts did
continue, but did not produce successful legislation. See, e.g., 1998 Hearings, supra note
61, at 1 ("For the past 9 years, there has been an extensive, ongoing effort within the
Congress to reform [the Mining Law.]").
126. See generally Christine A. Klein, Preserving Monumental Landscapes Under the
Antiquities Act, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 1333 (2002) (describing controversies).
127. See JONATHAN H. ADLER, ENVIRONMENTALISM AT THE CROSSROADS: GREEN
AcTIVIsM IN AMERICA 66 (1995) ("From the start the Clinton Administration took care to
place prominent environmentalists in appointive positions.").
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concerned with the mining industry than they could by negotiating with a
hostile administration. 128 Neither side had an incentive to bargain.
D. The Administrative Campaign
Having failed to secure legislatively the changes it desired in the Mining
Law during the early 1990s, the Clinton Administration turned to
administrative changes that did not require congressional approval. As one
Senate aide put it, "[t]here are a lot of tools that were left on the shelf that
might now be used. Reform advocates will be using every tactic at their
disposal, and I think the administration will be doing everything it can
administratively."' 29  Secretary Babbitt himself, in his memorandum
directing the 3809 rulemaking efforts that would be undertaken during the
1990s, stated
It is plainly no longer in the public interest to wait for Congress to enact legislation
that corrects the remaining shortcomings of the 3809 regulations. Instead, the time
has come to resume the process of modernizing the 3809 regulations first promised at
the end of the Carter Administration and begun at the end of the Reagan
Administration.
To that end, I direct you to restart this role-making [sic] process by preparing and
publishing proposed regulations.13
0
Babbitt's aim, senators charged, was to deny Congress the ability to
make policy.' 31 Babbitt characterized it differently, but the message was
the same: change in the Mining Law was coming whether from Congress
128. Leshy had argued in his book that the Mining Law's inefficiencies imposed
substantial transactions costs on mining companies above those that would apply if a leasing
system were used. See LESHY, supra note 5, at 181 (citing research showing that
transactions costs were 5-25 times greater than under a leasing system). The failure of
mining interests to embrace reform during the Clinton Administration suggests that either
the estimates are incorrect or the additional costs expected by mining companies from
royalties or other changes to the system were greater than the expected savings.
129. Garver & Squillace, supra note 18, at 14-4; see also 1997 Hearings, supra note 59,
at 3 (Statement of Barbara Cubin stating that "in a move that a Washington Post reporter
even labeled as stealth mining law reform, Secretary Babbitt has shifted the debate to a
forum in which he has the most broad control" away from legislative reform).
130. Memorandum from Bruce Babbitt, Secretary of the Interior, to the Assistant
Secretary, Land & Minerals Acting Director, Bureau of Land Management (Jan. 6, 1997),
available at http://www.blm.gov/nhp/efoia/RefDocument/3809jan6.html (last visited
December 30, 2002); see also Babbitt Creates Mining Reform Task Force, 198(5)
ENGINEERING AND MINING J. 16 (May 1997) ("It is plainly no longer in the public interest to
wait for Congress to enact legislation that corrects the remaining shortcomings.").
131. See 1998 Hearings, supra note 61, at 20 (statement by Sen. Larry Craig).
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or from the Administration.
3 2
Babbitt began to use his non-rulemaking administrative tools
aggressively during the late 1990s as well. For example, in November 1997
Babbitt concurred in a legal opinion by the department's solicitor that
reversed years of BLM practice and limited mining claims to a single five
acre "dependent" millsite, 33 making the ruling binding on the agency in the
future ("the Millsite Opinion"). Interestingly, Solicitor Leshy had earlier
suggested in his book on the 1872 statute that "it might even be appropriate
for the Interior Department and the courts to consciously reach results that
make the statute unworkable" as a means of spurring changes by
Congress. 34 Mining Law supporters identified these efforts as attempts to
do by regulation what the administration was unsuccessful at obtaining
through legislation. 35  Even Mining Law opponents noted the impact of
such actions: "[I]t is very possible that the proper interpretation [e.g.
Babbitt and Leshy's] and implementation of the claim limitations will spur
congressional reform of the Mining Law.
As commentators noted afterwards, "the impact of the opinion goes far
beyond claim location and patenting issues. Indeed, the opinion, and the
subsequent guidance documents and decisions that implement it
132. Babbitt stated on October 3, 1994 that:
This administration extended its hand to the industry and its congressional supporters.
They had their chance at reasonable reform, but chose to block it. We will not
abandon our efforts at reform. Next year, we will return on two tracks: We will again
pursue legislation and we will also explore the full range of regulatory authority we
now possess.
Garver & Squillace, supra note 18, at 144 (1999).
133. Solicitor's Opinion M-36988, Limitations on Patenting Millsites Under the Mining
Law of 1872 (November 7, 1997). Leshy had argued for this interpretation in his book. See
LESHY, supra note 5, at 180 ("The mill site is flatly limited to five acres in association with
either lode or (since 1960) placer claims.").
134. LESHY, supra note 5, at 282. Leshy had also argued that the statute's "true
functioning cannot be discerned simply from its text" because "[v]eneers of interpretation
and adjustment have been laid on it, some of which.., are substantially at odds with its
words and Congress's original intent." Id. at 22-23. Interestingly, Leshy suggested that
such interpretations were permissible and could be "deserving of "respect." Id. at 23.
135. See, e.g., Crown Jewel Mine Decision, Hearing before the Subcomm. On Forests
and Public Land Mgmt., Senate Comm. on Energy and Natural Res., 106th Cong. 4 (1999),
at 4 [hereinafter 1999 Hearings] (statement of Nevada Sen. Harry Reid that "the Solicitor
has taken upon himself to make a very novel interpretation of the Mining Law in an attempt
to do what they have been unable to do through cooperative efforts with the Congress;
reform of the Mining Law").
136. Roger Flynn, The 1872 Mining Law As An Impediment to Mineral Development on
Public Lands: A 19th Century Law Meets the Realities of Modern Mining, 34 LAND &
WATER L. REV. 301, 377 (1999) (noting the author was executive director of the Western
Mining Action Project).
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fundamentally alter the process for approving plans of operations for
mining on public lands, even where the claimant seeks no patent.',137 The
aggressiveness of the Millsite Opinion can be seen in both its attempt to
justify its result in the "plain language" of the 1872 statute, despite decades
of contrary practice, and the controversy over the validity of the opinion's
legal analysis. 38 As Garver and Squillace concluded, "[t]he Department's
decision to implement this important policy change without prior notice
and an opportunity for public comment suggested to some that the Millsite
Opinion is really designed to promote the Department's legislative reform
agenda.',139 A short time later in March 1999 the Department used this
opinion as the basis for reversing a series of administrative decisions
preliminarily approving a plan of operations for a proposed gold mine in
Washington state, after eight years and $80 million in project investment,"
4
0
$20 million of which was for permitting.' 4' This made clear the impact of
the Solicitor's opinion: "the rule established in the Millsite Opinion will, at
least in some cases, effectively deny the miner the right that is thought to
be enjoyed under the mining law, i.e., the right of self-initiation."
142
Opponents of the 1872 Mining Law hailed the Millsite Opinion and the
137. Garver & Squillace, supra note 18, at 14-12 (citations omitted); see also Flynn,
supra note 136, at 306-07 (noting impact of millsite opinion and other actions, calling "into
question the status quo" and suggesting that invalidation of claims under millsite opinion
will cause "a fundamental re-evaluation of the regulation of public lands hardrock mining").
138. See id. at 14-12 to 14-13 ("There is considerable disagreement among
commentators regarding whether the plain language of the statute actually limits the number
of millsite locations which may be associated with a mining operation."). Garver and
Squillace cite a number of commentators taking both sides of the issue; see also 1999
Hearings, supra note 135, at 2 ((statement of Sen. Larry Craig) (opening hearing by noting
implications of opinion and that "it appears to fly in the face of over 127 years of common
practice within the Department of the Interior"). Leshy defended the legitimacy of his
interpretation in testimony before the Subcommittee on Forests and Public Land
Management of the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources. See 1999
Hearings, supra note 135, at 5-9 (statement of John D. Leshy, Solicitor, Dep't of the
Interior).
139. Garver & Squillace, supra note 18, at 14-17.
140. Garver &Squillace, supra note 18, at 14-18 to 14-19 (citations omitted); see also
1999 Hearings, supra note 135, at 4 (statement of Sen. Harry Reid) (noting $80 million
figure).
141. 1999 Hearings, supra note 135, at 59 (statement of Danny E. Robertson,
Operations Manager, Crown Jewel Mine, Battle Mountain Gold Co.).
142. Garver & Squillace, supra note 18, at 14-20. As Leshy had noted in his earlier
book, self-initiation was central to the Mining Law. See LESHY, supra note 5, at 25 ("[w]hat
preoccupies friend and foe alike is the idea of free, self-initiated access to the federal
lands.").
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decisions under it as an impetus for change. 43 Mining interests reacted
with alarm, watching as affected companies' stock prices plummeted.'"
Congressional reaction was not to revise the statute but to forbid the
Interior Department from acting on the opinion and direct the approval of
the mine project rejected under it.14  The Senate Natural Resources
Committee held an oversight hearing on the issue, leading to a
recommendation from Senators Frank Murkowski and Larry Craig that
language be adopted permanently barring enforcement of the Millsite
Opinion 146  and language in an appropriations rider that barred
enforcement. 147 In response to the rider, the Bush Administration backed
away from the Millsite Opinion in 200 1.48
The Millsite Opinion was not the only attempt by Babbitt to aggressively
remake the General Mining Law of 1872 without legislative changes.
Garver and Squillace describe the multiple administrative actions taken by
Secretary Babbitt, including "fundamentally alter[ing] the 'discovery' test
that is at the heart of the 1872 Mining Law;"'149 use of administrative
withdrawals of lands from the mining law coverage, 50 a "crude but
effective method" for promoting legislative changes;' 5' and administrative
"reforms" of the patenting process,' 52 which Garver and Squillace conclude
were intended "to limit the issuance of patents wherever possible.'
53
143. Garver & Squillace, supra note 18, at 14-24 (quoting press release from
environmental groups as saying the decision would help the industry "feel the pain of a
statute far past its expiration date."); see also Nicole Rinke, The Crown Jewel Decision:
Recognizing the Mining Law's Inherent Limits, 27 ECOL. L. Q. 819, 839 (2000) (describing
Mining Law as having "reached its limit", the "privilege" it provides miners "dated" and
"no longer necessary" and applauding the Millsite Opinion as "in step" with modem
conditions).
144. See, 1999 Hearings, supra note 135, at 60 (Statement of Danny E. Robertson,
Operations Manager, Crown Jewel Mine, Battle Mountain Gold Co.) (noting Crown
Resources stock price fell 46% in one day and Battle Mountain lost over $100 million in
market value as a result of Crown Jewel decision).
145. Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-31, § 3006, 113 Stat.
57, 90-91 (1999); see also 1999 Hearings, supra note 135, at 2 (statement of Sen. Larry
Craig) (noting that appropriations bill "rescued" project).
146. Garver & Squillace, supra note 18, at 14-25 to 14-26.
147. Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act for FY2000, Pub. L. No. 106-
113, § 337.
148. See Bureau of Land Management, Instruction Memorandum IM No. 2001-174,
Application of the FY2000 Appropriations Act Mill Site Provisions to Plans of Operations
(September 30, 2002), at http://www.blm.gov/nhp/efoia/wo/fy0I/im200 1-174 html.
149. Garver & Squillace, supra note 18, at 14-26 to 14-31.
150. Id. at 14-32- 14-36.
151. Id. at 14-32.
152. Id. at 14-36 to 14-47.
153. Id. at 14-36.
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Babbitt's intent to steer the outcome toward implementing his policy
agenda can also be seen in his resistance to attempts by western
congressional representatives to use the appropriations process to force
inclusion of the Western governors in the rulemaking process.1 54 Western
senators of both parties viewed the Administration's efforts to regulate as a
threat. Senator Harry Reid (D. Nev.) argued that Babbitt's "most recent
attempt at revising 3809 regulations is another back-door approach to
mining law reform."' 155 He further argued that such an "effort illustrates the
Secretary's frustration with not getting mining law reform done his
way.105 6  Sen. Conrad Bums (R. Mont.) was more emphatic: "[t]his
administration has declared war on mining in our country and are
determined to remove it from public lands in any way shape or form.'157 In
short, from the perspective of mining interests, as the president of the
National Mining Association summed it up later, "[b]y and large, when you
look at our industry, we were clearly out of favor with the Clinton
Administration."' 58
Interior also revived a stalled earlier rulemaking effort and issued a final
regulation on bonding requirements in February 1997, over five years after
the proposal was first published. 59  This "revival" provoked opposition
from some Western states.) The House Resources Committee
subpoenaed Interior documents to "why the Secretary has allowed this
rulemaking to become final after such a long lapse without new public
input."' 6  The rule was also challenged by the Northwest Mining
154. See 1997 Hearings, supra note 59, at 2-3 (describing successful administration
efforts to prevent rider mandating a committee of western governors to report to Congress
on "the proper roles of States in mining, permitting and reclamation matters" to "assure the
Governors a place at the 3809 table").
155. d. at 6.
156. Id.
157. 1999 Hearings, supra note 135, at 3.
158. Stone, supra note 36, at 485.
159. The notice of proposed rulemaking was issued on July 11, 1991. See Mining
Claims Under the General Mining Laws; Surface Management, 43 Fed. Reg. 31,602 (July,
11 1991) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 3800). The final rule was issued on February 28,
1997. See Mining Clamis Under the General Mining Laws; Surface Management, 62 Fed.
Reg. 9093 (Feb. 28, 1997) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 3800).
160. See, e.g., 1997 Hearings, supra note 59, at 260-61 (expressing "outrage" over
bonding rule), Miscellaneous Mining Bills, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Forests and
Public Land Management, Senate Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources, 105th Cong. 6
(1998) (remarks by Gov. Miller, Nev.) [hereinafter Miller Speech] ("Since the beginning of
this [the 3809 rulemaking] initiative, I have questioned the legitimacy of, in essence,
changing the mining law through an administrative process.").
161. 1997 Hearings, supra note 59, at 2.
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Association for "failure to follow the requirements of the Regulatory
Flexibility Act in relation to assessing the effects on small entities"'62 and
overturned by the U.S. District Court.
63
In January 1997, Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt directed the
BLM to begin new rulemaking efforts to revise section 3809. The
revisions were to include: "(1) a revision to the definition of 'unnecessary
or undue degradation'; (2) new environmental performance standards; (3)
changes to the notice level provisions; and (4) coordination with state
regulatory efforts."' 64  Although the Secretary's directive termed this a
"restarting" of the earlier rulemaking process, the new initiative included
areas not covered by the earlier process.'
65
BLM began the campaign by publishing a notice of intent to propose an
environmental impact statement and request for comments on Babbitt's
memorandum and the issues it raised in April 1997.166 Among other
reactions, this prompted Western congressional representatives to use
oversight hearings to bring pressure to bear on Babbitt. For example, the
Subcommittee on Energy and Mineral Resources of the House Committee
on Resources held field hearings throughout the west on mining regulations
in 1997. As Subcommittee Chair Representative Barbara Cubin noted at
one of those hearings, "[I]n view the role of Congress to protect the system,
while I don't always agree with the decisions that are made by those
decision-makers in the executive branch, and, therefore, I can't always - or
really can't intervene on those decisions once they have followed the
correct procedure. But my job, and I think the job of the Congress, and this
oversight hearing, is to make sure that we protect the procedure. ,,167
Congressional reaction to the "restarted" 3809 rulemaking was
consistently negative, seeing the rulemaking as an attempt to bypass
Congress. 168  "On five separate occasions, Congress addressed the 3809
162. Draft E1S, supra note 107, at 2.
163. See Northwest Mining Ass'n v. Babbitt, 5 F. Supp. 2d 9, 15 (D.D.C. 1998.).
164. Butler, supra note 72, at 172.
165. See id. at 173 (noting that Babbit was "disingenuous at best, since Secretary
Babbitt directed the BLM to propose regulatory changes in areas where the 1992 BLM Task
Force review explicitly found that no regulatory changes were needed").
166. See 62 Fed. Reg. 16,177 (April 4, 1997) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 3809)
(1997).
167. 1997 Hearings, supra note 59, at 2.
168. See Christian Bourge, BLM Proposal Angers Miners, 107(31) AMERICAN METAL
MARKET, Feb. 17, 1999, at 6 ("A briefing of congressional staff last week attracted a larger-
than-usual crowd, according to one BLM staffer. Interest was high, according to one Senate
aide close to mining issues, because Congress believes the BLM is trying to bypass
congressional oversight of mining law reform with this move. According to the aide, the
proposed rule is likely to gamer some sort of congressional action in the coming months.
With the National Academy of Sciences report still in the pipeline and a great deal of
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rulemaking in appropriations statutes, directing BLM to consider particular
issues or to perform certain tasks before publishing final rules.' 69 Western
states and western governors also strongly opposed BLM's efforts, arguing
that "much of the proposed rule is unnecessary, unwarranted, or unwise.'
70
Nevada Governor Bob Miller, for example, termed the new rulemaking an
"attempt at seizure of control by Interior" of state powers. 17 ' When BLM
did not respond to the governors' concerns, Congress added language to the
Interior appropriations bill requiring it to do so.' 72 This proved ineffective,
however, as the BLM announced that the consultation was complete three
days after the appropriations bill was signed by President Clinton, even
though no additional contact had taken place.
73
The opponents of BLM's proposals, having failed in inducing
consultation, next turned to requiring an independent evaluation of the
3809 regulations by the National Academy of Sciences. 74 Interior's 1999
appropriations bill required that such a report be prepared and submitted to
Congress by September 30, 1999, and prohibited the Interior Department
from publishing final 3809 rules before then.175 The NAS then appointed a
opposition by the mining state representatives on the Hill, I could not imagine some sort of
oversight being initiated," the aide said.").
169. Butler, supra note 72, at 173.
170. Western Governors' Association, Policy Resolution 00-013, Regulation of Mining
(June 13, 2000), available at http://www.westgov.org/wga/policy/00/000013.htm (last
visited Feb. 8, 2003) (readopting resolution 97-006).
171. Miller Speech, supra note 160, at 6. Senator Larry Craig of Idaho argued Babbitt's
efforts were part of an agenda of "misguided forces" attempting to stop resource uses of
public land with the result that the Western public lands would become "museum pieces by
which Easterners can travel West in a bus and view the landscape and say, 'Ah, there was
the West that was,"' Miscellaneous Mining Bills, Hearing Beibre the Subcomm. on Forests
and Public Land Management, Senate Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources, 105th
Cong. 19-20 (1998) (remarks by Sen. Craig) [hereinafter Craig Speech].
172. See Department of Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 1998, Pub.
L. No. 105-83, § 339, 111 Stat. 1543, 1603 (1997).
173. See Butler, supra note 72, at 173 ("[j]ust three days after the appropriations bill was
signed into law by the President, and without any further contact between BLM and the
governors, BLM Director Pat Shea announced that the required consultation had been
completed and sent letters to Congressional leaders certifying that the requirement had been
met."); see also Letter from nine western governors to Pat Shea, Bureau of Land
Management (Feb. 5, 1998) (on file with authors) (expressing "grave disappointment" that
certification had been made and arguing that "the consultation process has yet to truly
begin"). Some consultation had taken place, however, during 1998. See Miller Speech,
supra note 160, at 15 (stating there had been some dialogue "in the last several months").
174. Westerners sought such an appraisal early. See Miller Speech, supra note 160, at 7
(calling for an NAS study).
175. See Department of Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 1999, Pub.
L. No. 105-277, Division A, Title 1, Sec. 120, 112 Stat. 2681, 2938-39 (1998); see also
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thirteen member committee of experts;, which began with a meeting in
February 1999. Despite the existence of the committee and an explicit
request by governors and senators from western states to refrain from doing
so until the committee had met, Secretary Babbitt published proposed
changes to the 3809 regulations on February 9, 1999 and released a Draft
Environmental Impact Statement 176 on the regulations shortly thereafter,
requiring comments by May 10, 1999.177 Babbitt also refused requests to
extend the comment period until after the NAS study was completed,
which would have allowed commenters to have the benefit of the NAS
report in drafting their comments. 78
BLM justified the February 1999 proposals as necessary to keep up with
changes in the mining industry since the 1980 3809 regulations had been
issued. For example, BLM noted that production had shifted almost
entirely to cyanide leaching technology from two-thirds of production
through that method in 1980.179 BLM also cited the series of GAO reports
from the 1980s as "highlighting, among other things, abuses from hardrock
mining, the need for bonding of mining operations, and the need for better
Murkowski, Craig, Reid, Bryan, Mining Industry Prevail on Hardrock Regulations Study,
ENGINEERING AND MINING JOURNAL, Nov. 1, 1998, at 32 (noting 58 to 40 vote against
amendment to strip rider from appropriations bill).
176. See Draft EIS, supra note 107, at 2.
177. See Mining Claims Under the General Mining Law; Surface Management, 64 Fed.
Reg. 6,422 (Feb. 9, 1999) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 3800) ("Send your comments to
reach BLM on or before May 10, 1999.").
178. See Butler, supra note 72, at 175 ("Secretary Babbitt refused those requests,
published proposed revisions to the 3809 regulations on Febrary 9, 1999, and released a
Draft EIS a few days later, requiring comments on both the proposed rules and the Draft EIS
by May 10, 1999."); see also Letter from Bruce Babbitt, Secretary of the Interior, to Senator
Craig Thomas (Jan. 11, 1999) (on file with authors) (rejecting delay and stating that "any
protracted delay in completing this rulemaking is simply not in the public interest. I am
committed to seeing that the environment is protected, and that the Nation's taxpayers are
spared further cost burdens of cleaning up after hardrock miners. That is why I intend to see
this rulemaking through to completion as soon as practicable").
179. See Mining Claims Under the General Mining Laws; Surface Management, 64 Fed.
Reg. at 6423 (Feb. 9, 1999) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 3800) ("BLM took a number of
steps to implement these recommendations, including development of a cyanide
policy .. "). This justification mirrored Leshy's earlier criticism of the Mining Law in his
book, in which he argued that the "basic problem" with the law was that from the start
"Congress almost wholly ignored major continuing changes in the nature of mining
activity." LESHY, supra note 5, at 17. Babbitt made similar arguments in support of the
3809 rulemaking in testimony before Congress. See Miscellaneous Mining Bills, Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Forests and Public Land Management, Senate Comm. on Energy
and Natural Resources, 105th Cong. 25 (1998) (remarks by Babbitt) [hereinafter Babbitt
Speech] ("One reason those 3809 regs got underway is precisely because of changing
technology in the industry. The heap leaching innovations are all brand new. They are
enormously productive. They involve a whole series of issues.").
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reclamation."' 180 Finally, BLM -cited the FPLMA as giving it a "non-
delegable and independent responsibility" to protect the public lands,
arguing that the act showed that "Congress intended that the Secretary of
the Interior determine what constitutes unnecessary or undue degradation
and not that the States would do so on a State-by-State basis. '"18
This prompted additional Congressional intervention into the rulemaking
process, with an additional appropriations rider requiring an additional 120
day comment period on the proposed rule and draft EIS after the NAS
report was delivered to Congress and prohibiting the finalizing of the rule
until after this comment period was over.'
8 2
The NAS panel delivered its report on September 29, 1999.' The
unanimous report, like all NAS panel reports, was subject to peer review
before its release. 84 In compliance with the appropriations rider, BLM
then began a 120-day comment period on the proposed regulations.!8"
Perhaps as a result of the earlier struggles over the 3809 rulemaking
process, Congress intervened again and required that the final rules be "not
inconsistent with" the NAS report's recommendation.' 86 Interior took a
narrow view of the appropriations rider, interpreting it to require only
consideration of the specific recommendations and not to apply to "subjects
180. Mining Claims Under the General Mining Laws; Surface Management, 64 Fed.
Reg. at 6423 (Feb. 9, 1999) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 3800).
181. Id. at 6424.
182. See Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-31, §32, 113 Stat.
57(1999).
183. See generally NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, HARDROCK MINING ON FEDERAL
LANDS (1999) [hereinafter Hardrock Mining], available at http://www.nap.edu/html/
hardrock fed lands/index.html.
184. See id. ("This report has been reviewed by individuals chosen for their diverse
perspectives and technical expertise in accordance with procedures approved by the NRC's
Report Review Committee."). On the reliability of NAS reports generally, see United States
v. Chischilly, 30 F.3d 1144, 1155 (9th Cir. 1994) (NRC reports "at least the functional
equivalent of a publication subject to peer review .... ").
185. See Mining Claims Under the General Mining Laws; Surface Management, 64 Fed.
Reg. at 57613 (Oct. 26, 1999) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 3800); see also United States
v. Chischilly, 30 F.3d 1144, 1155 (9th Cir. 1994) (NRC reports are "at least the functional
equivalent of a publication subject to peer-review .... ").
186. Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-113, § 357, 113
Stat. 1501, 1501 A-210 (1999). Since the final rules were not yet published when this rider
expired at the end of the fiscal year, identical language appeared in the Interior Department
Appropriations Act for FY 2001. See Emergency Supplemental Appropriations, Pub. L. No.
106-291 § 156, 114 Stat. 922, 962 (2000). The original form of the rider provided that the
3809 rules had to follow the NAS report. See Bureau of Land Management to Require All
Miners to Guarantee Clean-Up of Land, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Nov. 28, 2000, at 2000
WL 29944827.
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which lie outside the specific recommendations of the NRC Report.' 87
The fiscal 2000 appropriations conference committee report rejected this
interpretation, arguing instead that the rider imposed more significant
limitations on BLM in issuing the final rules.188
Babbitt's administrative campaign had some successes and some
failures. Congress exercised oversight over the Interior Department and
used its powers to hold hearings and add riders to appropriations bills to
prevent some of Babbitt's initiatives and alter others. In addition to the
visible impacts of the back-and-forth of administrative action and
congressional reaction are the invisible ones we cannot document-the
actions advocates of changes in mining law did not take because they knew
those actions would provoke unacceptable political retaliation from
Congress. Moreover, the advocates of mining law change within Interior
had to negotiate within the department and within the administration for
where the administration's political capital would be spent, since both the
department and the administration had other objectives as well.
The process may be as unpleasant as sausage making, but from the start
of the Clinton Administration until the 2000 presidential election was over,
the mutual interdependence of executive and legislative branches operated
as an effective check on agency action.
E. The Midnight Regulations
BLM issued final 3809 regulations on November 21, 2000,189 "the last
day that they could be published and still become effective before the end
of the Clinton Administration."' 90 (For convenience, these will be referred
to as the "midnight 3809 regulations.") Under the terms of the
appropriations rider, BLM could have issued the regulation at any time
after January 30, 2000 (i.e., the end of the required comment period
following the NAS report under the appropriations rider). Even allowing
time for consideration of the comments that BLM received during the final
round of public comment, the almost eleven-month delay before the
regulations issuance suggests that the post-election timing was not
accidental.
The midnight 3809 regulations were only a small part of an overall push
187. Butler, supra note 72, at 176 (quoting Memorandum from Department of Interior
Solicitor's Office to BLM (Dec. 8, 1999)).
188. See H.R. REP. No. 106-914, at 154 (2000).
189. See Mining Claims Under the General Mining Laws; Surface Management, 65 Fed.
Reg. 69,998 (Nov. 21, 2000) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pts. 2090, 2200, 2710, 2740, 3800,
9260).
190. Butler, supra note 72, at 177.
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by the administration to issue last-minute regulations.' 9' As Professor John
J. Pitney summarized it, "[tihis was a most unusual conclusion to a most
unusual presidency-if anything, Clinton ratcheted up his agenda at the
end... and was far more active at the end than other Presidents." 192 More
colorfully, Bush Administration Press Secretary Ari Fleischer later noted
simply that Clinton had "been a busy beaver[.]"'
193
The midnight 3809 regulations introduced substantial changes in the
1980 regulations. These included:
" expansion of bonding requirements for mining operations;
194
* requirement of interim management plans where mines are temporarily closed;
195
" increase in BLM authority to require modifications in plans;
196
" a new definition of "unnecessary or undue degradation;"1
97
" institution of a set of administrative penalties;
198
191. Several last-minute regulations dealt with mining issues. Jack Gerard, President,
National Mining Association, was quoted as saying that "[w]e've identified over a dozen of
these midnight regulations that have a direct negative impact on mining[.]" Carl M.
Cannon, The Long Goodbye, NAT'L J., Jan. 27, 2001, at 2001 WL 7181605.
192. Id.
193. Id
194. See Mining Claims Under the General Mining Laws; Surface Management, 65 Fed.
Reg. 69,998 (Nov. 21, 2000) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pts. 2090, 2200, 2710, 2740, 3800,
9260) (For convenience, the midnight 3809 regulations are cited to the provision of the
Federal Register in which they were made final, as the current version of the Code of
Federal Regulations has the current regulations that succeeded the midnight regulations.).
195. See id. at 70,121.
196. See id.
197. See id. at 70,115; see also id at 70,016 ("The revised definition of 'unnecessary or
undue degradation' in the final rule eliminates the current reference to the prudent operator
standard because the BLM believes it to be too subjective and vague. Instead the definition
defines 'unnecessary or undue degradation' in terms of failure to comply with the
performance standards of final § 3809A20, the terms and conditions of an approved plan of
operations, the operations described in a complete notice, and other Federal and State laws
related to environmental protection and protection of cultural resources. 'Unnecessary or
undue degradation' would also mean activities that are not 'reasonably incident to
prospecting, mining, or processing operations as defined in existing 43 C.F.R. § 3715.0-5.'
Based on public comments about the need for BLM to have explicit regulatory authority to
deny a proposed mining operation because of the potential for irreparable harm to other
resources, we have introduced an additional threshold for undue and unnecessary
degradation.").
198. See id. at 70,130.
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199
* elimination of notice level mining operations i.
* introduction of a "mine veto" provision allowing BLM to reject proposed mines;
200
and
• inclusion of new performance standards for mine operations.
20 1
Reviewing the details of each of these changes is beyond the scope of
this paper (and largely a theoretical exercise in any event, as many of the
details have since been changed). Briefly highlighting the more dramatic
changes, however, is important for establishing the expansive scope of the
midnight 3809 regulations.
Perhaps the most sweeping change the midnight regulations introduced
was the creation of a regulatory definition for the FLPMA's "unnecessary
or undue degradation" language. BLM's new definition of "unnecessary or
undue degradation" significantly changed BLM's prior practice, which was
based on the concept of a "prudent operator., 20 2  The new definition
defined "unnecessary or undue degradation" as "conditions, activities, or
practices that ... result in substantial irreparable harm to significant
scientific, cultural, or environmental resource values of the public lands
that cannot be effectively mitigated. 20 3  Notably, neither the draft
environmental impact statement nor the proposed regulations included this
provision,2° making public comment on the language used impossible (and
bringing an immediate legal challenge to the new rules).2°5
Mining industry advocates found the new definition unacceptable. They
argued that BLM's new definition was "open-ended" and
could be invoked to protect any environmental resource from any perceived harm. It
is the uncertain application of this provision that may have the most direct and
significant impact on future mining investments. Under this vague and subjective
standard, potential investors in mineral exploration and development have no
confidence that mines can be permitted. The regulation is an invitation to appeals
and litigation, and the risk always remains that BLM may discover "significant
resource values" after tens of millions of dollars have been invested in a mineral
property. Because mining claimants, operators[,] and investors have no assurance that
199. See Mining Claims Under the General Mining Laws; Surface Management, 65 Fed.
Reg. 69,998, 70,002 (Nov. 21, 2000) (codified at 43 C.F.R. pts. 2090, 2200, 2710, 2740,
3800, 9260) ("BLM decided the threshold should generally be set between exploration and
mining.").
200. See id. at 70,121.
201. See id. at 70,122.
202. See id. at 70,016 (discussing BLM's decision not to retain prudent operator
concept).
203. Id. at 70,115.
204. See Butler, supra note 72, at 178.
205. See infra note 227.
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a plan of operations can be approved - even if all applicable environmental standards
are met - they will direct their investments toward less risky ventures.
206
The mining industry had argued that leaving the term undefined allowed
for evolutionary improvements. As one mining company official stated at
an oversight hearing,
I think this is the keystone of 3809... and.. . allows for an evolution of techniques
and technical problems, [as well as] resolution of technical problems. As we get
better at reclamation and get better at operating, then those standards become
commonplace in the industry[,] and the 3809 is then updated by applying the
unnecessary and undue degradation rule."
2 0 7
A second important change was the elimination of notice level
operations. The midnight 3809 regulations severely restricted notice level
operations. 208  The mining industry argued that continued notice level
operations were important because they provided "the opportunity to gain
timely access to prospective areas to further assess their mineral potential
before investing the enormous amount of time and money required to
permit plan level disturbance." 209
A third major change was the introduction of the "mine veto" provision,
which allowed BLM to reject plans of operation on widely-expanded
grounds. Creating a means of preventing mining was critical to the
environmental groups' "reform" agenda.210 This provision was also of
major concern to the mining industry. National Mining Association
President Jack Gerard argued that:
[t]he "mine veto" provision in particular will deter any future investment or
exploration investment opportunities .... The disruption in investment confidence"
from this provision - let alone the cost of any mining activity shut down as a result -
206. Butler, supra note 72, at 179.
207. Hardrock Mining Issues, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Energy and Mineral
Resources, House Comm. on Resources, 105th Cong. 13 (1997) [hereinafter Jones Speech]
(remarks by Martin R. Jones, Senior Manager, NV Environmental Compliance, Newmont
Gold Co.).
208. See supra text accompanying note 199.
209. Hardrock Mining Issues, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Energy and Mineral
Resources, House Comm. on Resources, 105th Cong. 9-10 (1997) [hereinafter Upton
Speech] (remarks by Bill W. Upton, Manager, Environmental Affairs, Placer Dome U.S.,
Inc.).
210. See, e.g., Wald & French, supra note 4, at 81 ("The greatest weakness of the 1872
Law is that it essentially gives mining companies 'the right to mine,' regardless of the
damage their activities may do to other values."); id. at 85 (stating as first priority that
"[flederal land managers must have explicit authority to exclude or limit mineral exploration
and development activities on federal lands as well as to adjust the scope of these activities
to protect other public values").
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will have immediate and significant impacts on the hardrock mining industry.
211
Finally, the midnight 3809 regulations significantly changed the form of
the environmental standards applicable to mining regimes. Under the 3809
regulations from 1980, the substantive standards applicable to mining
operations came exclusively from federal and state laws and regulations on
environmental protection and mine reclamation. Thus, for example, the
Clean Water Act provided the substance of water quality rules governing
mines. "[A]n operator that had obtained necessary water quality permits
from the state or EPA, and complied with water quality standards, had met
BLM's test for preventing unnecessary or undue degradation with respect
to water quality."2" 2 During the 1980s, BLM supplemented the imported
environmental regulations with specific guidance on the conduct of
particular mining operations (e.g., cyanide and acid rock drainage), 213 but
these policies "did not create new water quality standards. 214  Indeed,
BLM's description of its activities in these areas showed a process quite
different from the midnight 3809 regulations. BLM reported to Congress
that it would "[ejstablish informal groups of experts from BLM personnel
who will be knowledgeable in this area[,] ... [dlevelop an external link to
cyanide technology expertise[,]" and coordinate with other agencies and
state governments.
215
Under the midnight 3809 regulations, however, compliance with federal
and state environmental and mine reclamation laws became necessary, but
not sufficient, for approval of mines. "These new standards, particularly
those that deal with water quality, transform BLM's role from that of a land
manager to that of [an] environmental regulatory agency. ,2 16 BLM now
required "the lowest practical level '217 of impacts on water quality, a level
211. NMA Seeks Mining Rules Injunction, PR NEWSWIRE, Jan. 4, 2001, WL 1/4/01
PRWIRE 12:06:00.
212. Butler, supra note 72, at 179.
213. See, e.g., Bureau of Land Management, Instruction Memorandum No. 90-566,
Cyanide Management Policy for Activities Authorized Under 43 CFR 3802/3809 (Aug. 6,
1990) (indicating policy designed to prevent "unnecessary or undue degradation" due to "an
increase in the number of operations using cyanide on public lands" and requiring "best
practicable technology" to neutralize or contain "solutions lethal to humans or wildlife");
Bureau of Land Management, Instruction Memorandum No. 96-79, Acid Rock Drainage for
Activities Authorized Under 43 CFR 3802/3809 (Apr. 2, 1996) (stating purpose as "fine
tuning" existing regulations on subject).
214. Butler, supra note 72, at 179.
215. Jamison, supra note 74, at 40.
216. Butler, supra note 72, at 179.
217. Mining Claims Under the General Mining Laws; Surface Management, 65 Fed.
Reg. 69,998, 70,114 (Nov. 21, 2000) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pts. 2090, 2200, 2710,
2740, 3800, 9260).
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that would be set on a "case-by-case basis.'
218
The midnight 3809 regulations also claimed authority for BLM over
water quantity issues. "These provisions insert BLM into water allocation
and use decisions and raise the possibility that BLM may prevent an
operator from using otherwise valid and approved water rights if BLM
determines that the environmental impacts of that water use are not
'minimized."' 219
The mining industry opposed federal performance standards not only as
an inappropriate one-size-fits-all standard for an area that required different
approaches for different locations and types of mining220 but also as an
imposition of potentially inconsistent standards from existing
environmental and reclamation standards.22' As one industry representative
noted at an oversight hearing, "Unlike other industries, operators of mines
cannot locate their mining sites in settings where compliance with national
design standards might be feasible.,
222
In sum, the midnight 3809 regulations vastly expanded BLM's authority
over mining, significantly increased the regulatory burden for the mining
industry, and included a major change in the type and degree of
environmental regulation used. They went well beyond generally
applicable environmental protection statutes to include mining-specific
provisions defined by BLM. The midnight 3809 regulations would have
significantly weakened the property rights of mineral rights holders,
expanded federal authority, and displaced state level regulation.
Midnight regulations are an important political weapon. As the Atlanta
Journal editorialized in November 2001, "The Bush administration is now
218. Id. at 70,012 ("BLM would determine the lowest practical level of a particular
impact on a case-by-case basis.").
219. Butler, supra note 72, at 181.
220. See Hardrock Mining Issues, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Energy and
Mineral Resources, House Comm. on Resources, 105th Cong. 8 (1997) [hereinafter Espell
Speech] (remarks by Ron A. Espell, Environmental Superintendent, Barrick Goldstrike
Mines, Inc.) ("[R]eclamation standards must be tailored to the site where mining occurs and
the type of mining that is proposed.... A one-size-fits-all standard imposed from BLM in
Washington simply cannot accommodate the many different environments where mining
will occur."); Upton Speech, supra note 207, at 10 (noting industry objection to one-size-
fits-all regulations); Jones Speech, supra note 205, at 12 ("[S]ite-specific flexibility is an
absolute necessity for regulations affecting hardrock mining."). The NAS panel also
rejected one-size-fits-all approaches. See Hardrock Mining, supra note 183 ("Simple 'one-
size-fits-all' soluti- ons are impractical because mining confronts too great an assortment of
site-specific technical, environmental, and social conditions.").
221. See Espell Speech, supra note 218, at 8 (noting "long list of permitting
requirements" already imposed and potential for inconsistency).
222. Jones Speech, supra note 207, at 12 (statement of Jones).
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caught in the crossfire of special-interest groups on one side and local
governments and industries burdened with the cost of regulations on the
other side. 2 23  For example, one of the best-known of the Clinton
Administration's midnight regulations was the imposition of new drinking
water standards for arsenic. The political calculation made the regulation
appear irresistible: "If President Bush revoked it, he would be criticized for
trying to poison citizens' water; if he retained it, he would be responsible
for a costly regulatory choice that would hamper an economy already
edging toward recession. 224
Even those who agreed with some of the substance of the midnight
regulations disagreed with the process. The Cincinnati Post, for example,
endorsed the substance of one of the midnight rules but argued that
"[w]hatever the merits of Clinton's decision, the way he went about it was
wrong-in no small part because he tried to sidestep the opposition [to the
rule] .... Clinton is unaccountable both politically and administratively for
his [executive] order.%
2 25
The immediate negative impact of the regulations was largely
concentrated in Nevada and the other mining states in the West, areas that
the outgoing administration had little reason to favor. BLM's own Final
Environmental Impact statement had concluded that the midnight 3809
regulations would result in "a loss of up to 6,050 jobs, up to $396 million in
total income[,] and up to $877 million in total industry output." 226 Outside
the West, however, the political benefits of the new regulations were
considerable, giving the outgoing Democratic administration an important
issue to use against the incoming Republican administration and Congress,
satisfying an important Democratic constituency (i.e., environmental
pressure groups), and punishing an important Republican constituency (i.e.,
the Western states that had voted overwhelmingly for Bush). From a
political point of view, the midnight 3809 regulations were a success.
F. Aftermath
Four separate lawsuits, brought by mining industries, environmental
pressure groups, and the state of Nevada, immediately challenged the
midnight 3809 regulations. 27 The new Bush Administration undertook a
223. Give Federal Regulations Close Look, ATLANTA J., Nov. 1, 2001, at A 18.
224. Douglas R. Cox, A Proposalfor Addressing Future 'Midnight Regulation,' 16(26)
LEGAL BACKGROUNDER (Washington Legal Foundation) (Aug. 10, 2001).
225. Our Forests, His Legacy, THE CINCINNATI POST, Jan. 6, 2001, at 8A.
226. Mining Claims Under the General Mining Laws; Surface Management, 66 Fed.
Reg. 54,834, 54,835 (Oct. 30, 2001) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 3800).
227. See Roger Flynn & Jeffrey C. Parsons, The Right to Say No: Federal Authority
over Hardrock Mining on Public Lands, 16 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 249, 279-80 (2001)
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review of many of the departing Clinton Administration's midnight
regulations, including the midnight 3809 regulations.
On March 23, 2001, the Department of the Interior's BLM issued a
notice of proposed rulemaking to suspend parts of the midnight 3809
regulations and restore the 1980 regulations while a review was made.
2 28
This sparked an organized campaign to encourage public comments in
favor of retaining the midnight 3809 regulations that led to over 47,000
"repeated messages" that "succinctly" asked BLM to not change the
midnight regulations.229  Environmental organizations denounced the
review in strong language. 30 For example, Stephen D'Esposito, President
of the Mineral Policy Center, declared that "[t]his is like going back to the
(describing the four lawsuits challenging the regulations). BLM described the claims
brought by the mining industry plaintiffs and the State of Nevada as including violations of
the (1) "specific congressional provisions cited above applicable to promulgation of the
revised 3809 rule;" (2) "notice and comment provisions of the Administrative Procedure
Act, particularly with regard to the 'substantial irreparable harm' (SIH) standard of the final
regulatory definition of the term 'unnecessary or undue degradation;' (3) "National
Environmental Policy Act;" (4) "Regulatory Flexibility Act;" (5) "Federal Land Policy and
Management Act;" and (6) "General Mining Law." See Mining Claims Under the General
Mining Laws; Surface Management, 66 Fed. Reg. 54,834, 54,834 (Oct. 30, 2001) (to be
codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 3800). The environmental pressure group plaintiffs alleged "that
the 3809 regulations are not sufficiently stringent and improperly allow mining operations
on lands without valid mining claims or mill sites." Id.
228. See Mining Claims Under the General Mining Laws; Surface Management, 66 Fed.
Reg. 16,162 (Mar. 23, 2001) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pts 2090, 2200, 2710, 2740, 3800,
9260) (providing notice and comment of the proposed rule).
229. See Mining Claims Under the General Mining Laws; Surface Management, 66 Fed.
Reg. 54,834, 54,836 (Oct. 30, 2001) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pt 3800) (discussing how
the BLM changed the proposed rule in response to public comments).
230. See Stop the Mining Rollback!, at http://www.minesandcommunities.org/
Action/action2.htm (last visited July 5, 2003) (In a campaign against the "rollbacks" and
offering a site to submit comments to BLM on the revision of the 3809 regulations, the
website stated: "Unless concerned citizens stop them, President Bush and Secretary of
Interior Gale Norton will revoke environmental mining safeguards and replace them with
weak, outdated rules. The current mining rules govern the activities of the mining industry
on publicly owned lands managed by Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and would better
protect wildlife and rural communities threatened by toxic pollution. Bush/Norton want to
rescind the current mining safeguards, and replace them with old mining rules that left a
wake of environmental devastation and taxpayer-funded mine pollution cleanups. We need
your comments to oppose the Bush/Norton mining rollback."). But see Stop the
Distortion!!: A Response to the Mineral Policy Center's "Stop the Rollbacks Web Page, at
http://www.e-mj.com/ar/miningstop distortion response (last visited July 5, 2003)
(containing the response of the mining industry in a site countering the "Stop the Rollbacks"
site).
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James Watt era of public-lands management[".], 23
BLM adopted a phased strategy for revising the midnight 3809
regulations. The first step was the revision of the bonding rules to exempt
those plans of operation approved before January 20, 2001. This allowed
time for BLM and the states to implement the new rules while retaining the
new requirements prospectively. On June 15, 2001, BLM issued a new
final rule (known as the "2001 bonding regulations") modifying, but
retaining, the bonding requirements imposed by the midnight 3809
regulations.232 The mining industry association supported the retention of
the bonding requirement.233 By doing so, the new administration undercut
support for mining law opponents to push through appropriations riders
preventing rollback of other portions of the midnight 3809 regulations.234
Mining law opponents had succeeded in moving a rider through the House
on a 216-194 vote to prevent rollback of the midnight 3809 regulations,
235
but Democratic Senator Harry Reid of Nevada, a long-time champion of
the mining industry and the assistant majority leader, 36 was able to block it
in the Senate.237
The second phase was the October 2001 revision of the remaining
provisions, reverting to the mining performance standards in place before
the midnight 3809 regulations, removing the "substantial irreparable harm"
provision, changing the joint and several liability rules, and removing civil
231. Charlie Cray, Mining Their Own Business, MULTINATIONAL MONITOR, May 2001,
at 16.
232. See Mining Claims Under the General Mining Laws; Surface Management, 66 Fed.
Reg. 32,571 (June 15, 2001) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 3800) (providing details of the
final rule).
233. See Christian Bourge, Hard-Rockers Score Big Mining Reg Win, 109 AM. METAL
MARKET 2 (Oct. 26, 2001).
234. See Christian Bourge, BLM Keeping Tougher Bonds for Mines on Federal Land,
AM. METAL MARKET 13 (June 18, 2001) ("[Tjhe timing of the announcement limits the
ability of supporters to fight on Capitol Hill for retaining the revised 3809 provisions in their
entirety, making it much harder to attach a rider to the fiscal 2001 Interior appropriations
bill aimed at blocking such a rollback.").
235. See Christine Dorsey, House Votes Against Rolling Back Environmental Mining
Rules, LAS VEGAS REV. J. (June 22, 2001).
236. Christain Bourge, Capitol Hill Vote on Regs Irks Miners, AMERICAN METAL
MARKET 25 (June 25, 2001).
237. See Christian Bourge, Land Management Agency Inches Ahead on Mine Regs,
AMERICAN METAL MARKET 12 (August 31, 2001) ("Supporters of the tougher 3809s admit
that they do not have the votes needed, in conference negotiations over a final House-Senate
compromise measure, to keep long time metals mining industry supporter Sen. Harry Reid
(D. Nev.) from striking the rider.").
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penalty provisions. 23" BLM justified its action as necessary to allow time
for examination of the concerns raised in the lawsuits challenging the
midnight 3809 regulations.239 The third phase was to seek, simultaneously
with the October 2001 revision, comments on the actions taken then as well
as on additional changes.4
We summarize the evolution of the 3809 regulations through their
various incarnations in Table 1. Briefly, of the thirty-nine categories of rule
changes considered significant enough to warrant inclusion in the BLM's
summary of changes made by the 2001 regulations,241 eighteen
substantially returned to the 1980 regulations' provisions, eighteen retained
the midnight regulations' provisions, and three (JUD definition, penalty
provisions, and environmental performance standards) contained unique
features or significant alterations.
In short, the 2001 regulations made five major changes to the midnight
3809 regulations:
* restoration of the 1980 regulations' definition of operator;
242
9 revision of the definition of "unnecessary or undue degradation" by removing
the "substantial irreparable harm" clause of the definition, which had been the
subject of challenges in several of the lawsuits over the midnight 3809
regulations because it was not contained in the proposed rule that led to those
238. See Mining Claims Under the General Mining Laws; Surface Management, 66 Fed.
Reg. 54,834, 54,836 (Oct. 30, 2001) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 3800) (prqviding
background on the rulemaking).
239. See id. at 54,835 (stating that "undertaking implementation of certain provisions of
the new regulatory program applicable to hardrock mining on public lands before additional
examination of the legal, economic, and environmental concerns that plaintiffs raise could
prove unnecessarily disruptive and confusing to the mining industry and the states that,
together with BLM, regulate the mining industry").
240. See id. (stating that "we recognize that because of the high level of interest in this
rule among affected industry groups, environmental organizations, and states, we might
benefit from providing an opportunity to comment on the specific changes we are adopting
today").
241. See generally id. at 54,850-58 (providing background on the rulemaking).
242. The key to this change was to eliminate the suggestion that BLM could routinely
pierce the corporate veil to attribute liability to corporate parents of the entity operating the
mining claim, as is done under the Superfund statute. See id. at 54,837 ("BLM adopted the
'material participation' standard in the 2000 rules based on a concept authorized under
CERCLA, as enunciated in a recent Supreme Court decision. However, there is no
indication that Congress intended to override state laws in this regard under FLPMA ....
Thus, we decided we will not include the concept of "parent" or "affiliate" responsibility in
the definition of the term "operator" in subpart 3809. Under these final rules, we will hold
the appropriate entity liable through established state common law principles.").
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regulations;
243
* revision of the liability provisions to remove joint and several liability for
environmental damage and provide for liability only for obligations that accrue
while a claimant or operator holds its interest, essentially returning the rule to the
pre-midnight regulation practice;
244
* removal of many of the specific environmental and performance standards in
the midnight 3809 regulations, retaining only the sections codifying
"longstanding BLM policies on acid mine drainage and the use of cyanide" and
the general standard, which "form[s] a foundation upon which operators should
base their plans of operations" and about which BLM had not received
"widespread concern;'2 45 and
* elimination of the administrative civil penalty provisions, for which BLM now
argued the legal authority was unclear.
24
243. Id. at 54,836. BLM justified the change by stating that:
BLM has concluded that, as a matter of basic fairness, we should not have adopted
this truly significant provision without first providing affected entities an opportunity
to comment both as to its substance and as to its potential impacts. Because the
potential impacts of the SIH standard are so dramatic, BLM is reluctant to continue to
include such a provision at all. BLM is also concerned that it would be very difficult
to implement the standard fairly as it relates to significant cultural resource values.
Id. at 54,837. BLM also noted that it had significant regulatory tools under other statutes to
address environmental concerns without adding to the 3809 regulations. Id.
244. See Mining Claims Under the General Mining Laws; Surface Management, 66 Fed.
Reg. 54,834, 54,836, 54,837 ("In effect, this [change] returns the regulation to that in place
prior to the 2000 rule."). BLM justified this change by arguing that "[t]he 1980 rules
contained no express provision addressing the apportionment of liability among operators
and mining claimants." Under the previous (1980) regulatory scheme, liability was
established on a case-by-case basis under state common law principles. The BLM Manual
in effect since 1985 reflected that under the 1980 rules both operators and mining claimants
could be liable for reclamation. The Manual provided: "Reasonable reclamation of surface
disturbance is required of all operators, regardless of the level of operations. Mining claims
are commonly leased and the claimants are often unaware of the level of operations
occurring on the claims. The mining claimants are ultimately responsible for reclamation if
the operator abandons the operation." (citing BLM Manual, Section 3809.11). Thus, even
without an express regulatory provision, BLM considered operators and mining claimants
responsible for reclamation. Id. at 54,838.
245. Id. at 54,836.
246. See id. ("Throughout the process of preparing the 2000 rule, BLM was aware, as
was the NRC, that BLM's authority to impose civil penalties is uncertain. Therefore, we
have decided to remove these sections. At the same time, we intend to work with the
Congress to clarify our authority. BLM's authority to establish an administrative penalty
scheme is uncertain and, until such authority is clearly established, administrative penalties
should not be part of subpart 3809."); see also id. at 54,843 (stating that "this is an unsettled
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As noted earlier, a number of changes introduced by the midnight 3809
regulations remained in effect.247 The vast majority of these were relatively
minor, resulting in a regulatory impact assessment by BLM that the new
rules would have no appreciable economic impact.
2 48
The new Administration eventually returned most of the substance of the
3809 regulations to their state under the 1980 regulations, with some
clarifying and codifying changes and with alteration of the bonding
requirements. The most controversial of the midnight 3809 regulations
were undone within a year of taking effect and the future of the 3809
regulations once again is subject to the political oversight of Congress.
III. SOLVING THE PROBLEM OF MIDNIGHT REGULATIONS
"This whole move toward midnight regulations is something on which Congress
should send a clear message to future presidents. The kind of things you haven't
been able to do during your term, you shouldn't try to do as you're closing the door."
Rep. Roy Blount, Chief Deputy Whip, U.S. House of Representatives, April 2001249
The 1996 Congressional Review Act 250 ("CRA") provides one means of
dealing with midnight regulations. Under the CRA, regulations can be
overturned by a majority vote of both houses of Congress, without
requiring a full notice and comment rulemaking proceeding as would
simply repealing the regulation. Such a vote must be taken within sixty
days of the official publication of a final rule in the Federal Register,
however, which significantly limits the ability of Congress to address the
large quantity of midnight regulations that often accompany a change in
control in the executive branch.5 Moreover, when a rule's impacts are
concentrated in a particular region or on a particular industry, there may not
area for which it is prudent to await clear guidance from Congress before promulgating
rules").
247. See, e.g., id. at 54,838 (making no change to provisions on submission of plans of
operations); see also id. at 54,840 (making no change to provisions on acid mine drainage
and leaching operations and impoundments).
248. See Mining Claims Under the General Mining Laws; Surface Management, 66 Fed.
Reg. 54,844 (stating that "we do not expect today's rule to have significant annual impacts
on the economy").
249. Juliet Eilperin, Republicans Target 45 Regulations to Overturn, WASHINGTON
POST, Apr. 8, 2001, at Al.
250. 5 U.S.C. §§ 801-08 (2001).
251. See, e.g., Audrey Hudson, Republicans Expect No Further Use of Review Law to
Void Clinton Rules, THE WASHINGTON TMEs (March 14, 2001) ("'The time problem is a
factor. The clock is ticking pretty loudly at the moment,' said Sen. Larry E. Craig, Idaho
Republican and chairman of the Republican Policy Committee.").
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be sufficient political support to change the rule.252
In his book, John Leshy attempted to justify administrative strategies
remarkably like those he implemented at the Interior Department by
arguing that the Mining Law is "obsolete. '25 3 Although conceding that the
statute was technically not obsolete, since Congress had regularly amended
it in minor ways,254 he relied on Congress' "inability to achieve major
reform" as sufficient proof of obsolescence.25 5 But that a law has not been
changed when one wishes it had been is not sufficient to declare open
season on its express provisions through administrative means. Politics
may block a major "reform" but change is not an end in itself. Politics has
virtues - our political institutions provide accountability and the obstacles
that prevent "reform" of the Mining Law are largely ones put in place by
the Founders to block legislation that might oppress a regional or other
minority. 6  Indeed, the Founders deliberately created a federal
government in which legislating is difficult to accomplish.257 If eastern
interests seeking increased revenue for the general treasury from lands
located largely in the west must negotiate with westerners for the terms of
the revenue extraction because of westerners' political power, easterners'
attempts to extract revenue from the west will be moderated by westerners'
sense of self-preservation.
Politics rescued the 3809 regulations from the Babbitt-Leshy
administrative campaign, as Congress used the appropriations process to
force the administration to take into account western interests in mining
252. See, e.g., id. ("Many of the regulations created by the Clinton administration
involved Western issues and have little national support to overturn them, Republicans said.
'If you are going to create a monument in Utah, what do people in New Hampshire care
about that"' asked Sen. Rick Santorum, Pennsylvania Republican and chairman of the
Republican Conference. 'They may, but it's harder to set up those kind of votes, to get that
kind of support for something that's much more of a local issue.").
253. LESHY, supra note 5, at 270.
254. Id.
255. Id at271.
256. See Jonathan L. Entin, Separation of Powers, the Political Branches, and the Limits
of Judicial Review, 51 OHIO ST. L. J. 175, 184-85 (1990) (noting that the founders
"established a system designed to prevent overreaching by one branch at the expense of
another and of liberty"); see also id at 219 (noting that framers expected Congress and the
executive "to rely primarily upon their own political self-defense mechanisms when
interbranch disputes arose").
257. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 62 para. 9 (James Madison) (Roy P. Fairfield ed.,
1981) ("The necessity of a Senate is not less indicated by the propensity of all single and
numerous assemblies to yield to the impulse of a sudden and violent passion, and to be
seduced by factious leaders into intemperate and pernicious resolutions."); see also Redish,
supra note 16, at 673 (arguing that the Framers "inserted numerous republican-like speed
bumps to democratic rule").
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law changes. Although not all of the administrative "tools" used by Babbitt
and Leshy could be blocked, they were prevented from implementing most
of their major initiatives through appropriations riders. Despite Leshy's
theories of obsolescence, mining law change was forced back into the
Congressional arena where the administration had to negotiate with those
directly affected by changes to 3809.
The political process of creating legislation has several important
advantages over midnight regulations. -Perhaps the single most important
advantage is forcing policymakers to consider federalist solutions. As
Nevada Senator Harry Reid argued in a statement at a 1997 oversight
hearing on Babbitt's administrative campaign, "[t]he Secretary's
prescription for mining law reform is a one-size-fits-all approach. He
wants to direct uniform Federal standards for a gold placer operation in
Alaska, surface copper mines in Arizona, and underground gold mines in
Nevada. As any miner knows, this will not work."258 Most western states
have active programs to address environmental issues surrounding
mining.25 9  Because of impacts such as the consideration of federalist
solutions, the requirement that regulators work their way through the
political process improves (perhaps only slightly) the quality of
regulations.260
The fundamental problem of midnight regulation is that the incentive
structure for regulators is wrong (or, perhaps, more wrong than usual).
258. 1997 Hearings, supra note 59, at 6 (statement of Senator Harry Reid).
259. See, e.g., Western Governors' Association, supra note 170 ("Western states also
have comprehensive state mineral exploration, development and reclamation programs,
enforced in coordination with federal land management agencies. These state programs set
criteria for permitting exploration, development and reclamation of mining operations, with
provisions for financial assurance, protection of surface and ground water, inspection and
enforcement, designation of post-mining land use, and public notice and review.").
260. One concern with federalist solutions is that they leave open the possibility of a
race-to-the-bottom, as states compete for industry by lowering standards. That concern
should be less in the mining industry since mines must be located where minerals are. Of
course, decisions about which deposits to develop are affected by regulatory considerations
(which can make development uneconomic by increasing costs), but the fixed location of
mineral resources makes capital-intensive mining industries more vulnerable to
expropriative taxation and regulation than other industries, suggesting that the real concern
is not a race-to-the-bottom but a race-to-expropriate. Even by the 1880's, mining had
become a capital-intensive industry. See JOEL K. WATERLAND, GOLD & SILVER OR SWEAT &
TEARS 11 (1988) (describing in detail the equipment used in the 1880s).
What role then exists for the federal government? The mining industry has suggested
"[o]versight in the context of looking at the standards between States, and applying and
assuring some reasonable level of consistency between States." See 1997 Hearings, supra
note 59, at 15 (statement of Bill Upton, Manager, Environmental Affairs, Placer Dome U.S.,
Inc.).
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Regulators in the lame duck period are not only freed from political fallout
from their actions but have positive incentives to cause problems for the
incoming administration. Fixing that incentive structure requires
eliminating the benefits of midnight regulations for the regulators. We
offer two proposals to do so.
First, the attractiveness of midnight regulations could be reduced by
making midnight regulations less durable. Currently, repealing-a regulation
(regardless of when it is issued) requires a rulemaking proceeding similar
261to that necessary to create a new regulation. Making regulations issued
"at midnight" (after the election, for example) able to be repealed without a
new rulemaking process but simply by issuing a notice in the Federal
Register would make pre-midnight rules more attractive. Bureaucrats
would then have an incentive to issue rules during the pre-midnight period,
when the outgoing administration could still be made to pay a political
price if it overreached. Rules might also be prohibited from going into
effect for a period after the new administration was inaugurated, allowing
withdrawal of proposed final rules without new rulemaking.
Second, midnight regulations could be made more costly to
bureaucracies. Limits on the substance of new regulations issued during
the midnight period could be imposed (only regulations that were related to
emergency needs, for example) or agencies given a limit on the number or
size of regulations they could issue during the midnight period. If agencies
faced a "budget" of regulations, they would have to make choices on which
subjects to "spend" their budget.
The problem with such changes is that not all regulations issued in the
post-election period are illegitimate. The functioning of government
requires the regular issuance of a myriad of rules, notices, and the like.
Weakening all regulations issued "after midnight" will unnecessarily
weaken these regulations as well. Further, granting too much ability to
new administrations to "undo" prior administrations' rules may well create
a new problem of "sunrise regulations" in which the prospect of change
induces a frenzy of lobbying as a new administration takes office.
Although we recognize that these are serious problems, we contend that
control of midnight regulations are more important because the new
administration is subject to the normal political constraints. Any changes
in the prior administration's regulations will be subject to public scrutiny
and will have to be defended by the new administration. Thus, on balance,
we think the reforms we suggest will improve the regulatory process.
261. See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S.
29,42 (1983) ("[A]n agency changing its course by rescinding a rule is obligated to supply a
reasoned analysis for the change beyond that which may be required when an agency does
not act in the first instance.").
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CONCLUSION
The story of the midnight 3809 regulations ended "happily"-the
endgame effects of the closing days of the Clinton-Gore administration
were largely undone and the regulatory balance restored.262 Is the midnight
regulation story thus of little long term importance (at least until the next
change in administration)?
No. Midnight regulation is a serious problem for three reasons. First, it
undermines the system of political accountability for regulatory policy
provided by Congressional oversight of regulatory agencies. This
oversight can at times turn into capture and undue influence; it nonetheless
plays a critical role in restraining the unelected bureaucrats in federal
regulatory agencies from overreaching. Second, it costs incoming
administrations political capital and attention. Diverting a new
administration from its own regulatory agenda is costly and reduces the
responsiveness of government to popular will. Third, it undermines the
rule of law by encouraging agencies to deliberately overreach in ar effort
to embarrass the new administration. In this case, an administration whose
lawyers saw statutory law as "itself an obstacle" to change,263 used its
powers to attempt to obtain through regulation what it could not obtain
through the Congress.
Ending the opportunity for midnight regulation is thus an important step
in improving the regulatory process. The measures suggested above offer
some means of doing so by raising the cost of midnight regulations.
262. For a scorecard of other Clinton Administration midnight regulations, see Mercatus
Reports, What Happened After Midnight?, (Summer, 2001), available at http://www.cato.
org/pubs/regulation/regv24n2/mercatusreports.pdf (last visited January 3, 2003).
263. Id. at 6. Leshy argued that "its text has frequently been supplanted by judicial or
administrative agency decisions, and much of the practice under it is unwritten, fashioned
more by custom and official acquiescence than by positive decision. Such encrustations on
the statute tend to make the Mining Law a special preserve for a relatively few hardy souls
who deal with it in a professional context." LESHY, supra note 5, at 6.
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APPENDIX
Table 1: Selected Alternative 3809 Regulations 264
1980 Midnight 2001
§ 3809.5 Definition of Operator








§ 3809.5 Definition of Public Lands
BLM lands under '4 '4
Mining Laws
Lands where mineral '4 '4
estate is federal and
surface estate is private




surface owner does not
consent.
264. Sources for Table 1: Mining Claims Under the General Mining Laws; Surface
Management, 66 Fed, Reg. 54,834, 54,834-54,862, especially 54,850-54,858 (Oct. 30, 2001)
(to be codified at 43 C.F.R. Part 3800); Mining Claims Under the General Mining Laws;
Surface Management, 65 Fed. Reg. 69,998, 69,998-70,132 (Nov. 3, 2000) (to be codified at
43 C.F.R. Parts 2090, 2200, 2710, 2740, 3800, and 9260)); Surface Management of Public
Lands Under U.S. Mining Laws, 45 Fed. Reg. 78,902, 78,902-78,915 (to be codified at 43
C.F.R. Part 3800); Surface Management, 43 C.F.R. § 3809(1981) (codification of 45 Fed.
Reg. 78,909 (Nov. 26, 1980)), and Surface Management, 43 C.F.R. §3809 (2002)
(codification of 65 Fed. Reg. 70,112 (2001));Steven G. Barringer, "The 3809 Kitchen Sink,"
(Paper No. 2) and Jim Butler, "Environmental and Reclamation Performance Standards in
the New 3809 Regulations," (Paper No. 5), New BLM Surface Management (3809)
Regulations (Rocky Mt. Min. L. Fdn. 2001).
265. 43 C.F.R. § 3809.31(d)(2000)(65 Fed. Reg. 69,998, 70,115).
266. 43 C.F.R. § 3809.31(d) (2002).
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Mitigate impacts. Not defined; but part of NEPA definition; NEPA definition;
NEPA analysis 267  mandatory on site; measures specified
voluntary off site.2" by BLM to protect
public lands 269
Comply with 4 4270 4271
environmental laws.
Reclamation "Reasonable"; at Concurrent Concurrent
earliest feasible time
272
Comply with 4 4
performance standards.






§ 3809.11 Notice vs. Plan Operation Threshold (Non-Casual Use)
Notice required
< 5 acres per year 4
< 5 acres, exploration in 4 4
non-special area
Plan required
> 5 acres, or special 4
status area
> 5 acres, or exploration 4 4
in special status area
Mining, milling, and 4 4
bulk sampling over
267. 43 C.F.R. § 3809.2-1(b) (1981) (45 Fed. Reg. 78,902, 78,913).
268. 43 C.F.R. § 3809.420(a)(4), see also Barringer, supra note 264, at 2-6; Butler,
supra note 264, at 5-3-5-4.
269. 43 C.F.R. § 3809.5; 3809.420(a)(4) (2002).
270. 43 C.F.R. § 3809.420(b) (2000) (65 Fed. Reg. 69,998, 70,122).
271. 43 C.F.R. § 3809.420(b)(4)-(6) (2002).
272. 43 C.F.R. § 3809.1-3(d)(3) (1981) (45 Fed. Reg. 78,902, 78,911), 45 Fed. Reg.
78,902 (1980) (codification at 43 C.F.R. pt. 3800); see also Butler, supra note 264, at 5-5.
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1,000 tons
Special status areas 4
expanded (e.g.
monuments, T & E
species, critical habitats)
§ 3809.100 Mining Claim Validity, Existing Rights, and Mine Economics










Required validity exams , 4
before approval.
§ 3809.201-.204 State and Federal Government Coordination
MOUs in each state BLM gives state the BLM gives state the
provide coordination, lead when lead when
States may lead some requirements are as requirements are as
program elements, strict, strict.
BLM must concur on 4273 4 4
Plan approvals.
BLM retains inspection 4274 4
and enforcement option.




§ 3809.301-313 Notice and Plan of Operations Contents and Processing
§ 3809.401-.412
BLM review of Notices 4 4 4
in 15 calendar days;
Plans (for completeness:
2000), 30 days, (with
273. 64 C.F.R. § 3809.1-6 (1981) (45 Fed. Reg. 78,902, 78,912).
274. 64 C.F.R. § 3809.3-6; 3809.3-2 (1981) (45 Fed. Reg. 78,902, 78,914).
275. 64 C.F.R. § 3809.1-6 (1981) (45 Fed. Reg. 78,902, 78,912).
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option of 60 more days:
1980)
Open-ended time frame 276 .4277 4278
for Plans for NEPA
(EIS), NHPA, and T&E
species compliance
Public Comment period On Environmental On Plans, at least 30 On Plans, at least 30
Analysis, if sufficient days days
interest






Operators required to 279 4
provide all studies/data
BLM needs to comply
with NEPA.
§ 3809.334 Temporary or Permanent Closure
§ 3809.336
§ 3809.424
Maintain site in safe and . .4 .4
clean condition.




time and condition of
site/equipment: 2000).
Notice expires after 2 .4 .4
years.
Plans may be terminated .4 '1
after 5 consecutive years
of inactivity.
276. Id.
277. 64 C.F.R. § 3809.41 l(a)(3)(ii)-(iii) (2000) (65 Fed. Reg. 69,998, 70,120).
278. 64 C.F.R. § 3809.41 l(a)(3)(ii)-(iii) (2002).
279. Not specified.
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Financial Guarantee Requirement (i.e., Bonding)
§ 3809.500-.599
Bonds required only for 4
Plans at BLM's
discretion.
Actual cost bonding 4 4
required for all Notices
and Plans.
Operator provides initial 280 40
reclamation cost
estimate.
Financial guarantee must 4 4
cover 100% of
reclamation costs.
No new corporate 4 4
guarantees accepted.
§ 3809.600 Inspection and Monitoring
Operators must allow 4 4 4
BLM to inspect
operations.
Inspections four times Policy Mandatory Mandatory
annually where cyanide
is used or significant
potential for acid rock
drainage.
Inspections twice Policy Policy Policy
annually for all other
operations.
§ 3809.700 Type and Adequacy of Penalties for Non-Compliance
BLM issues notices and 4 4281 4282
records of
noncompliance.
Federal injunctions and 4 4 4
criminal prosecution
may be used.
BLM can suspend or Can seek court 428 4285
revoke Plan and nullify injunction to cease 1 1
280. Plan merely states measures to be taken. 64 C.F.R. § 3809.1-5(c)(5)-(6) (1981); 45
Fed. Reg. 78,902, 78,912.
281. 64 C.F.R. § 3809.601 (2000).
282. 64 C.F.R. § 3809.601 (2002).
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Notice for failure to operations and liability







Under MOUs, BLM 4286 .4287 .4288
would refer certain
noncompliance actions
to other federal and state
agencies for
enforcement.
Standards Surface and Ground Water Protection
All operators must (shall: 4289 V& minimize water 4
2001) comply with pollution 290





Pit water quality must 4
not endanger wildlife,
public water supplies, or
users.




pollution and changes in
flow in preference to
water treatment or
283. 64 C.F.R. § 3809.3-2(c) (1981) (45 Fed. Reg. 78,902, 78,914).
284. 64 C.F.R. § 3809.602 (2000) (65 Fed. Reg. 69,998, 70,129).
285. 64 C.F.R. § 3809.602 (2002).
286. 64 C.F.R. § 3809.3-1(c) (1981) (45 Fed. Reg. 78,902, 78,914): State Enforcement.
287. 64 C.F.R. § 3809.604(a) (2000) (65 Fed. Reg. 69,998, 70,129).
288. 64 C.F.R. § 3809.604(a) (2002): civil action by U.S Attorney.
289. 64 C.F.R. § 3809.2-2(b) (1981) (45 Fed. Reg. 78,902, 78,913).
290. 64 C.F.R. § 3809.420(b)(2) (2000) (65 Fed. Reg. 69,998, 70,122); see also Butler,
supra note 64, at 5-6-5-8.
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replacement.
American Indian Traditional Cultural Values, Practices, and
Resources.
Consultation with Case-by-case basis Part of Plan review Part of Plan review
American Indian is used
to develop mitigation
(where possible: 2000).
Handling of Potentially Acid-Forming, Toxic, or Other Deleterious
Materials.





Other requirements 4 See next 5 entries. See next 5 entries.
imposed based on site-
specific review
according to BLM
policies and BEEN (acid
rock drainage) policy.
BEEN control measures '1






Static or kinetic testing 4 '
must be used with
respect to potentially
acid forming materials.
BEEN control must 4
focus on prevention or
control of acid-forming
reaction.
Potential migration of 4 '
BEEN must be prevented
or controlled.
Effluent treatment 4 4
291. 64 C.F.R. § 3809.5 (2000). 65 Fed. Reg. 69,998, 70,114.
292. 64 C.F.R. § 3809.5 (2002).
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293. And with applicable tribal and local laws/requirements. 64 C.F.R. § 3809.420(b)
(2000). 65 Fed. Reg. 69,998, 70,122.
required if source and
migration controls do not
prove effective.
Air Quality
Applicable Federal and Shall comply Must comply Shall comply
state air quality
standards, including the
Clean Air Act
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